Are the hostilities in Kursk Oblast just the beginning? Interview with military expert Mykhailo Samus

Why Kursk Oblast?

hromadske: Could this operation be a preventive one – designed to stop a potential Russian offensive in Sumy Oblast?

Mykhailo Samus: It could be anything—only General [Oleksandr] Syrskyi can answer this question. We can only speculate. Any operation is conducted with clearly defined goals and objectives. One way or another, it is usually about improving the operational or tactical situation.

Of course, this operation may be aimed at preventing Russia's aggressive actions. The enemy launches air and artillery strikes from its territory.

However, I assume that this is a publicity stunt. In reality, this offensive may also be part of a broader strategic-level operation that should turn the tide of the war.

Our forces have gone deep into the Russian Federation and are gaining a foothold there. Was this the plan, or is it a reaction to the situation? So to speak, the operation was more successful than planned.

Any operation has certain operational and strategic objectives. Tactics are the details we don't know for sure. However, I can say for sure that the breakthrough to a certain depth is carried out in accordance with the operation plan, which clearly states to which line each unit should reach. An offensive into enemy territory is launched only after thorough reconnaissance.

This is definitely not amateurish. It is not possible for a battalion to go without knowing where it is going. In an operation of this magnitude, one of the most important tasks is to follow the plan.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

For example, if a grouping is conducting a raid, then according to the plan, approximately the same group in terms of size and composition – and possibly more – should cover the flanks. The enemy should not be allowed to hit the offensive group from the flanks.

In addition to advancing in depth, the front of the operation is also expanded. That is, Ukrainian troops protect the flanks from a breakthrough by Russian forces.

The geographical features of the area are also taken into account when planning. There are rivers in the combat zone in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian troops are trying to move along their courses to secure their flanks.

A strategic mistake by the Russians

The enemy is now moving reserves to Kursk Oblast from other axes, including Kharkiv. Could this cause the Russian offensive in the area of Vovchansk and Lyptsi to stall?

This time, the Russian leadership made a completely wrong decision. In my opinion, the Russians made a mistake when they decided not to send powerful groupings to neutralize the threat of a breakthrough by Ukrainian forces.

At least two or three divisions would be needed to strike at the Ukrainian flanks and create problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kursk Oblast. Of course, this would lead to a halt to the offensive in Donbas, because only from there can such forces be withdrawn.

Instead, the Russians decided to continue their offensive in eastern Ukraine. Putin personally confirmed this, saying that the offensive is only accelerating. This is completely unresonable in this situation. They have decided to scrape together any reserves from all directions and throw into the battle a "hodgepodge", third echelons, the Akhmat special forces and the like.

In the end, some troops were deployed from Ukraine—from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and the Vovchansk axis in Kharkiv Oblast. In other words, the Russians are trying to stop the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast with little blood. This is a completely wrong decision from a military point of view, as these forces are not enough.

Indeed, now Russian forces can create separate points of resistance and strike at our positions. However, their units are not sufficient for concentrated attacks to, for example, threaten our flanks or completely stop the frontal advance of Ukrainian troops.

For one or two weeks, the Russians will try to assemble this hodgepodge and throw it into battle. However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to destroy or capture these reserves. That is, what is happening now will continue. Sooner or later, in order to stop our offensive, they will have to transfer entire formations – that is, divisions or regiments.

In a few weeks, the fighting in Kursk Oblast will become a huge problem for the Kremlin. But then it will be too late to correct the situation, because by then Ukrainian troops will be able to gain a foothold on the designated lines.

In fact, the Russians made the wrong decision in the first place, and now they continue to implement it, driving themselves into a trap. They are "smearing" their reserves in all directions and using them inefficiently.

Soon the situation for the enemy on the Vovchansk axis may deteriorate dramatically – if they withdraw a significant part of their forces from there now, Ukrainian troops will be able to launch a counteroffensive there. This is obvious.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

The same situation will be elsewhere, where the Russians will hastily remove entire connections. If they begin to withdraw their forces from the Pokrovsky direction, accordingly, their offensive will be choked there. This will allow Ukrainian forces to improve their positions in the east.

Discord in the Kremlin

If the Russians decide not to sacrifice their offensive, might they not have enough reserves to drive the Ukrainians out of Kursk Oblast?

Absolutely right. Moreover, I would like to draw attention to another important aspect. When [Vladimir] Putin was holding a meeting of the Russian Security Council, his aide Alexei Dyumin and Viktor Zolotov, the commander-in-chief of the so-called Rosgvardia (Russian Guard) troops, were present.

Dyumin and Zolotov are Putin's closest aides, his personal bodyguards since the 1990s. According to some insiders, Putin appointed Zolotov and Dyumin to oversee the so-called counterterrorism operation in Kursk Oblast, creating another decision-making power center.

The head of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, has actually failed the defense of Kursk Oblast, and now he is responsible exclusively for the offensive in eastern Ukraine, which is his task until the end of this year. The Kremlin is not changing it, and it will take a lot of effort to implement.

In the meantime, Putin's closest associates, Zolotov and Dyumin, must somehow stop the Ukrainian offensive and stabilize the situation. And yet, they have only the Russian Guard and the FSB at their disposal. These forces are definitely not enough to stop the Ukrainian offensive, which is a large-scale military operation.

After some time, Dyumin and Zolotov will realize that their forces and reserves are not enough to counter the Ukrainian army in Kursk Oblast. When they report this to Putin, they will be forced to say that they need more powerful forces – full-fledged combat-ready military units. This will lead to a conflict between Zolotov and Dyumin on the one hand and Gerasimov on the other. After all, it is Gerasimov whom Putin's associates will demand to redirect several divisions to Kursk Oblast, from where he needs these forces for his offensive in eastern Ukraine.

An extraordinary situation arises when two powerful groups of influence will conflict over entire divisions. It may also happen that the effectiveness of the enemy offensive in eastern Ukraine will decline, and the Russians will not be able to stabilize the situation in Kursk Oblast. In the future, this could lead to personnel rotations – with regard to Gerasimov, for example.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

This is a rather difficult and unpleasant situation for the Kremlin. The Kursk operation dealt a powerful reputational blow to Vladimir Putin personally. And the fact that he is throwing his closest associates into Kursk Oblast demonstrates the level of the problem. The Ukrainian offensive brings discord to the system, and for us, it is a positive process that opens up new opportunities.

Will mobilization help the aggressor?

If the Russians lack reserves, does a large-scale mobilization scenario emerge?

It is possible, but it will not affect the situation here and now. First, they need to recruit the [draftees], at least to dress them in something, which will take a month. It takes another month to train them. Even if mobilization is carried out now, its effect may not come until October. And by then it will be too late.

I am sure that the offensive in Kursk Oblast is only a part of a large strategic operation of our forces. When planning this operation, the command took into account all factors, including mobilization.

Ukraine needs to prove itself before November, when the US presidential election will take place. We will not achieve victory by strategic defense alone. Already in 2024, we must demonstrate to our allies that we can conduct asymmetric offensive operations. This is exactly what is happening now.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

Mobilization will not help the enemy with the situation in Kursk Oblast. It can only affect the battlefield during the winter campaign. At the moment, mobilization will not give anything from a military point of view, but will add tension to Russian society, which is puzzled by the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into Russia’s territory. The stupor that has now set in in the Kremlin is obviously also one of the goals of the operation, which, in my opinion, is just beginning.

Will Ukraine have enough reserves to continue the offensive?

When planning an operation, everything is taken into account: reserves and logistics. If this operation has been launched, all its details must have been calculated. General Syrskyi is not new to military affairs, he has already planned many large-scale operations.

What will the ATACMS strikes on Russia change?

According to Forbes, the Ukrainians have deployed a large number of air defense batteries and electronic warfare systems in Kursk Oblast. Are there any signs that Ukraine is using American Patriots or F-16 fighters in Russia?

We don't have many air defense systems. Patriot is an artificial tool that has its own specifics. It can shoot down ballistic missiles that threaten strategic facilities and large cities.

For example, in Kursk Oblast, the Russians have already used several Iskander ballistic missiles to hit a group of Ukrainian soldiers consisting of 15 soldiers. But this is complete idiocy!

It makes no sense to use Patriot during the operation in Kursk Oblast. There are other air defense systems that can cover our forces from enemy tactical and army aircraft. Instead, Patriot systems should be saved for other purposes. The same goes for the F-16.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

The thing is that we receive information from long-range radar surveillance aircraft - AWACS. These are the aircraft of our allies. F16s, unlike the Soviet fighters in our fleet, can immediately receive data from these reconnaissance aircraft, which allows them to select a long-range target while in the sky.

However, these aircraft receive more information in the southern sector than in the eastern sector. Our F-16 fighters simply won't be able to effectively target targets in Kursk Oblast, so they lose one of their main advantages.

In addition, the F-16s are valuable as an aid to our ground-based air defense systems in Ukraine.

Instead, German and American armored vehicles such as Marder and Stryker are taking part in the battles in Kursk Oblast, and the US and German governments have nothing against the use of these weapons in Russia. Are we close to lifting the restrictions on the use of long-range ATACMS missiles in Russia or Germany providing us with Taurus missiles?

I think Germany will not provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles in the near future. As for the American long-range ATACMS missiles, I also see no reason why we should not be allowed to use them inside Russia.

This decision now depends on the will of only two people – President Joe Biden and his Vice President Kamala Harris. Apparently, they are influenced by advisers Jake Sullivan and William Burns, who are convincing their leadership that "escalating the conflict" is not in the interests of the United States.

I don't know why they believe that hitting targets in Russia with ATACMS missiles could lead to nuclear strikes on Washington. I also cannot explain why we are still not allowed to strike airfields in Russia.

Strikes on airfields are extremely important. When we strike airfields and Russian air defense fails to respond, they are forced to take their planes somewhere else. This gives us more freedom of action.

Now we are attacking enemy airfields with kamikaze drones. Sometimes they manage to get past air defense and reach the target. However, these drones are slow, so Russian aircraft have time to take off and evacuate. ATACMS ballistic missiles can reach any airfield in the target area from Ukraine within 5 minutes, which is a game changer.

All we need to do is launch one ATACMS missile at one airfield so that there is not a single airplane within 300 kilometers of Ukraine on the territory of the Russian Federation as everything would be removed from there. The pilots will not sleep in the cockpit, so that in case of our missile strike they will be ready to evacuate the aircraft in 5 minutes.Mykhailo Samus, military analyst

It is often said that we have fewer missiles and airplanes than Russia. But this means nothing if we can target Russian airfields. Even one such strike can force enemy aircraft to stay as far away from the combat zone as possible. They will quickly realize that at any moment a missile can come in their direction – a ballistic missile from ATACMS or a cruise missile from F-16, which Russian aircraft may not even see.

It is not the number that matters, but the fact that we have long-range capabilities and means of destruction. If we have such capabilities, the Russians will be forced to respond to them. And this reaction is predictable: no aviation will be based in the strike zone.

Therefore, from a military point of view, I cannot explain why the United States does not allow us to hit targets in Russia with ATACMS missiles. This is contrary to logic.

If we received this permission to use ATACMS now, could it change the course of the war?

Of course it would. If we had driven Russian aircraft out of airfields within 300 kilometers of Ukraine, we would have gained a significant advantage. This would allow us to see the takeoff of an aircraft heading to the battlefield 500 kilometers away from Ukraine. We would have had much more time to react. In this case, we could effectively counter enemy aircraft with F-16 fighters and other tools at our disposal.

Let's say we see that Su-34s have taken off 500 kilometers away and are heading to the front – we can scramble the F-16s, we can prepare air defense systems, and warn units on the ground. Now they are only 100 kilometers away, and they can arrive in a few minutes, use KAB guided aerial bombs, and quickly disappear from our radar. To force the Russians out of the airfields near the border is to radically change the situation. Not only in the context of the fighting in Kursk Oblast, but in this war in general.