“Military personnel will not be able to do it alone”. Hero of Ukraine and representative of the General Staff Mezhevikin

“We are bumping into mobilization”

You are a career tanker, a combat commander of several tactical groups, and have been in the hottest areas: liberating Kyiv region, visiting the Bakhmut sector, participating in the Kharkiv and other operations. How do you like it at the General Staff? Do you miss field work?

Of course, it is very difficult to adjust, and you always want to return to a more comfortable and understandable environment, where there are tasks you have to perform, where it is much easier. Where there are more ordinary people, united by an idea, fighting for each other and trying to do what they can to save the lives of people around them.

How can you describe the current situation at the front? At what stage of the war are we now? The Russians are advancing so rapidly that almost every day we lose village after village, city after city.

The situation is really very difficult now. And I would not want to color it with any colors. I want everyone, from the young to the old, to understand that they cannot give up and think that someone will do something for them.

It is difficult because, first of all, new people are joining the army. Many of them do not even understand what is happening and how to behave in the new environment — it is difficult to pass on to a person the knowledge gained over months or years of service in the Armed Forces during basic training.

From my own experience, I can say that it will never happen that 100% of the personnel who join a military unit will be able to fight right away.

Regarding the training of new recruits: is it possible to change something, particularly in training centers? We had an article about the many problems: recruits complain about the poor quality of training, the lack of instructors, including those with combat experience, the Soviet system of standards, and the fact that they are assigned to different jobs. Is it possible to make a difference here?

Of course, it is possible. Attempts and steps are always made to improve the system.

First and foremost, we need to hear from people who are undergoing basic training, their feedback on the quality of the training, what they need and vice versa. You can apply directly to the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, or through trust sites.

But does it work?

Yes, it does. We receive a lot of requests, and we respond and find out why the problem has arisen.

As for what you said… Let's start with the lack of instructors.

Now military units are having trouble releasing personnel who are ready to be instructors. Because they don't have enough personnel, and again we are bumping into mobilization.

We cannot take people out of the military unit until a sufficient number of replacements arrive and there is a certain “percentage”. Commanders do not want to let go of experienced personnel who are the backbone of any unit, whether it is a platoon, company or battalion.

But this process is partially underway — a procedure has been proposed to recruit personnel who have combat experience but have been wounded and cannot perform combat missions to the training center.

You say civilians or those who fought in 2014 were recruited as instructors. Again, there is a problem, and many complain about their lack of combat experience. These people immediately go to military units to gain combat experience for at least 3 months. But then the number of instructors decreases again, because there is a constant turnover.

How many instructors are there now per 100 recruits?

It is different in each training center. When mobilization peaked, we had to increase the number of locations. There was one instructor for 10-12, sometimes 15 people, although this is a lot.

By the way, when was the peak of mobilization? After the mobilization law was passed?

Yes, it was.

Did this peak last for just a few months?

Yes, it did. And then we increased the number of locations, created new ones, so as not to concentrate personnel in one place. Because the enemy's intelligence is very good. There are, let’s say, representatives of society who, out of recklessness or for money or their ideological beliefs, leak information to the enemy.

In general, it's ideal to have one instructor per squad. That's 7 people.

When you presented the changes to the training of recruits, you said that basic military training was being extended from a month to a month and a half. But will this improve the quality of training? Or is it that the General Staff cannot allow more for now?

Clearly, an increase in the period will improve the quality of training. But this quality is also influenced by the instructors and the availability of training centers.

Now we have more time to train personnel. This makes it possible to introduce new topics and areas of study, to unload the program. That is, instead of practicing from morning to night without rest and then again the next day, it is possible to spread the number of hours over the days. If necessary (this depends on the pedagogical skills of the instructors), independent study time will be distributed. The instructor should treat the students not as replacements, but as his own unit.

Are the training centers adequately equipped now?

Of course not. If they were, we would not have problems with logistics, with requests from commanders to allocate additional funds for the purchase of equipment that improves the training and material base. All this needs to be increased and scaled up.

But there are improvements here — the problem is being recognized and they are trying to solve it. For the next year, we are already budgeting twice as much money for training: if this year it was 400 million, then in 2025 it will be almost 900 million hryvnias.

Additionally, by the end of the year, we are working on issues for all training centers, preparation facilities, and reserve battalions. We are talking about purchasing property in various areas: Starlinks, radios, Mavic, FPV systems, computers, laptops, software, night vision devices.

There is assistance from the state, partners, public organizations, and foundations. But I would still say that this is not enough.

Adaptation course in brigades should last 15 days

How long does it take from training to sending the mobilized to the front? Basic training lasts for a month and a half, and then, as you said, there should be an adaptation course in the brigades. Is this really happening? We know many stories of unprepared soldiers being sent to the front line. Is it realistic to ensure that this adaptation period for recruits is provided in all brigades?

Everything is feasible, and a military unit can independently increase or decrease this period, depending on the situation.

It is very difficult to make any decision here. But the most that depends on the Armed Forces, and on us, is to provide training. What is up to the commanders and officers is to adapt the personnel who have joined the military units.

Adaptation in military units should take 15 days. Some units do it longer.

Now, after the basic general military training program has been extended, the adaptation program has changed. It was approved recently. It provides more details on what exactly adaptation should include and what a military unit commander should do.

What do you think should be done about the large number of cases of unauthorized desertions from the army? According to our interlocutors, it's about 100,000.

This is for the entire war, you mean. I don't have that number, so I can't tell you whether it's a large number or a huge number. Our Armed Forces are about a million people.

Some of the military end up leaving unauthorized for various reasons. But a third of them come and are ready to continue performing tasks, only in another unit. There are a number of reasons that influence their decisions, it's more about emotions.

Those who have decided in their hearts that this is not theirs, and they were born to smell flowers and jump in a field of daisies, and that all the rest, all the difficult decisions or actions to protect the state should be done by someone else will still say that they are not trained, not ready, and that they have not been provided with anything, no matter how good is the training.

So is the transfer guaranteed?

Yes, it is. I know that special training units have been set up to bring back people who have left military units without permission, and then they are distributed.

“The military personnel will not be able to do it alone at the same pace”

What do you think of the unauthorized desertion as a public step that draws attention, in particular, to clear terms of service? Should the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff talk about this? After all, clear terms were promised after the mobilization law was passed, but now they are silent about it. Should the General Staff be honest and say that there is no clear timeline now, but that they are, for example, providing better rotations?

I have a question for you: do you think this work is not being done?

I think it is, but no one knows about it. That is, there is no communication with society.

Communication with the public is not my area of expertise, but I know that this work is being done. And not only in the Armed Forces, but also at the political level, at the state level. This is definitely being worked on, and there are many options. Those who are involved in this can tell you better what the obstacles are.

But I know and assure you that the work is underway, and military leaders are not indifferent to what happens to people who have been fighting for a year, two or three.

Everyone understands that there are a lot of people who, knowing the end or rotation period, would gladly take their belongings now, fight for six months and return for six months. This is understandable. It will be the same if you increase the payments, it will also stimulate people.

As for my attitude to the unauthorized desertion as the public step... I generally think that leaving positions and military units is a betrayal. First of all, it is a betrayal of your people, those who are fighting next to you. That is, “I will save my life, and let someone else die for me.”

If a person left a position, they created conditions for the enemy to enter those positions, move deeper, and thereby destroy our people on the left/right. Accordingly, there was a failure and a wave of losses of positions, territories, and settlements.

And if someone thinks that “now I'm going to show by example, to protest”, they are doing a disservice to everyone and, above all, helping the katsaps.

Do you agree with the estimates that the front has actually crumbled? And what is the key problem then? Again, is it the lack of people, resources, or the management system?

If the “frontline actually crumbled”, then there would be fewer people in Kyiv and Dnipro, and people would flee Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv.

I said that the situation is complicated, it is very complicated. And you ask whether the decisions made are sufficient or insufficient. So I say again: everything depends on the society as a whole.

The military will not do it alone. They can't do it all the time, and they won't be able to do it if we continue to fight at the same pace for another month, two, three, four, five months, or a year.

How are the war and the enemy changing? Are we keeping up with these changes?

War is changing all the time. Are we keeping up if we are the ones who are mostly implementing these changes? The enemy has learned most of the things that they are using now (techniques and methods of warfare) from us. But they have the advantage of implementing and scaling it much faster.

“I believed in a quick end to the war at the very beginning”

What role does armored vehicles play in this war? By the way, in a previous interview you said that few people want to study to become a tank driver. Is it because this is a drone war?

The role of armored vehicles has always been and remains important. Without it, it is impossible to evacuate, transport personnel, or storm positions. If we take small, localized improvements in the tactical situation, tactical actions, assault or defensive, then we can work with drones. But armored vehicles have always been important during combat operations and remain so.

The only thing that needs to be improved is the protection of these vehicles. And not just from weapons of destruction, but also from surveillance equipment and other impacts on these pieces of iron.

Everyone at all levels has said that drones should fight. That this is the war of drones, that everything is going digital... Everything will never be completely digital. That is, the soldier will still remain the main determining unit that will raise, so to speak, the flag of victory on the position, over the house or in the country.

By the way, while demonstrating the destruction of hardware by kamikaze drones to get people interested, to start learning these tools or donating, we also showed how easy it is to destroy combat vehicles with these tools.

But no one shows that the combined effect of electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, and air defense increases the survivability of all armored combat vehicles. Because it is not interesting. There are no bangs, no explosions, no physical results. And electronic warfare also makes it impossible for drones or reconnaissance to operate, makes destruction impossible, and increases survivability. It is a large complex, a struggle of actions and counteractions.

How much did the Western “leopards” and “Bradleys”, on which we had high hopes, help us in the past? Or were they idealized?

Any armored vehicle has helped to accomplish many tasks and save lives. Foreign hardware is head and shoulders above Soviet models in terms of its performance.

So, of course, this help is very tangible. But, as you say, nothing can be idealized. That is, if there is a large complex of means that a military unit has, they do not work in the interests of the action, but in the interests of the task. And all of this should work in a complex, in interaction with each other, providing and covering the forces and means that destroy the enemy.

Finally, let me ask you if you believe in a quick end to the war?

I believed in a quick end to the war at the very beginning. Now I realize that even if we continue to fight like this, or even if a decision is made to withdraw (let's fantasize) the rashist troops back to their borders or beyond them, the war and the occupiers' plans will not change until their society realizes what they have done. Not politicians, not Putin and his crazy team —the Russians did this.

If they do not understand this, in 5 years, 10 years, it will smolder, they will escalate the situation, continue some local actions, and then, having regained their strength, they will start taking revenge again.

I really liked what volunteer, public figure, founder and former head of the Come Back Alive Foundation, former Deputy Minister of Defense of UkraineVitalii Deyneha recently wrote: “We have long since moved to a war not for victory, but for survival. And the sooner we change our strategy to reflect this, the more chances we have to survive.” Do you agree with this?

Yes, indeed. This is a war for survival. If we lose, Ukrainians will be persecuted.

The rashists don't need the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian idea. They don't need Ukrainian patriots, those people who fought for Ukraine, who actively show, manifest and defend their position. This will simply be the destruction of the nation.

But we are fighting and we will win. The main thing is not to give up. It's hard, it's painful, but we have to do it. And we must do it together. The victory is ours.