Opinion-maker Vitaliy Portnikov on Ukraine's vision of victory and whether war will end when Putin dies

hromadske: In the debate with Yulia Latynina, you expressed a lot of theses, which you have repeatedly voiced in many publications, blogs, or interviews. Why did this conversation cause such a stir among Ukrainians? Is Russian information space still important for them?

Vitaliy Portnikov: It is not only about the information space. This is a discussion that determines priorities. When Russians and Ukrainians speak differently, perhaps what some of my Russian colleagues say is convincing for many. But when it happens during a discussion, you can compare the system of evidence, the system of values.

In my opinion, you somewhat exaggerate the importance of the Ukrainian perception of this history. People from many other former Soviet republics have spoken to me about these debates. Their reaction was the same as that of the Ukrainians. Oddly enough, this perception also arose among many returnees to Israel, Jews by origin.

Do you mean similar fatigue from Russian imperialism?

Of course. We have all passed through this imperialism – and yet many have never seen the meeting of this imperialism with non-imperialism at the level of public debate.

That is why these debates are being watched in Russia. Since even people with anti-imperial views in Russia itself, perhaps, did not see such a clash either.

It is important to note that this is not a clash of enemies. This is a discussion between people, as if from the same liberal camp – between those who speak about democracy and oppose Putin. At the same time, the narrative is completely opposite.

Some believe that the empire is a historical success. Some that it is a historical tragedy. This debate has been going on for centuries.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

By the way, this was proven by the example of Napoleon Bonaparte. If Yuliya Latynina had mentioned his name in a conversation with her Polish colleagues, she would have been surprised to learn that Poles appreciate Napoleon, because he restored Polish statehood. That is, in Poland he is perceived not as an imperialist, but as an anti-imperialist. That is why even the Polish national anthem celebrates Napoleon.

I generally have a hard time understanding the tendency to talk about personalities rather than historical narratives. Each person lives in their own time and makes their choices in the context of that time. Therefore, we often evaluate people based on historical examples and from a modern perspective. Then, something changes in our worldview.

Those Russians living in exile abroad who oppose Putin and the war often continue to spread imperial narratives. Are they doing it on purpose?

In my opinion, the Russians were formed as an imperial nation, but not as a political nation. That is why they are not very interested in the problems of the peoples of Russia, for example. You may have noticed that in my conversation with Yulia Latynina, this problem was not mentioned at all.

Even when Crimea was discussed, Crimean Tatars were not mentioned. Perhaps it was a mistake on my part, but my interlocutor perceived Crimea exclusively as a Russian territory – inhabited by Russians. This is a sign of imperial thinking.

Where does Russian imperialism begin — from history lessons in high school? Does propaganda have a decisive role in shaping their worldview?

The modern Russian state was formed from Moscow's imperial ideology. The Principality of Moscow became the Moscow Kingdom, which turned into the Russian Empire, which in turn became the Soviet Union. The USSR won the Second World War, conquered half of Europe and half of Asia and became a world superpower on a par with the United States of America. This is an example of continuous expansion.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

Even the events of 1917 generally did not change this progress in people's imaginations. We are dealing with a Moscow-centric model of the empire. People in Russia perceive this as a norm of state building.

Imperialism does not begin at school, it begins already in the family. Such conscience is a product not only of education, but also a consequence of a kind of compensation. If a person does not have the ability to control their own country, then the only possibility of compensation is the management of other peoples. And this management leads to contempt.

For example, some Russian liberals, such as Yulia Latynina, speak disparagingly of the Also known by the acronym BLM - Black Lives Matter - it is a decentralised movement that emerged in 2013 in response to a series of murders of African Americans in the United States. In 2020, it gained international prominence.Black Lives Matter protest movement. They don't realize that this movement, as well as public figures like Martin Luther King, Jr., called for freedom.

In general, Russians and Ukrainians were freed from serfdom at virtually the same time that African Americans in the United States were freed from slavery. African Americans and Ukrainians managed to do this work for freedom. Therefore, the president of the United States can be an African-American man, and the vice president of the United States can be an African-American woman. That is why Ukraine can be an independent state, the president of Ukraine can be an ethnic Jew, and the prime minister an ethnic Buryat — and no one cares at all. We hardly mention the ethnicity of our politicians or cultural figures.

At the same time, if you take the standard of living of Russians in the provinces and compare it with the standard of living of African Americans in the United States, then this comparison will not be in favor of the Russians.

Even some peoples of Africa live better than provincial Russians, because the Russians did not do real work on freedom. They never tried to rethink their own or other people's history. Probably, that is why I joined that broadcast from Ukraine, and Yulia Latynina - from emigration.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

Polls of Russians show that they are proud of Stalin, May 9, Yuri Gagarin, and now the annexation of Crimea. And where is their struggle for freedom? For them, freedom is a rebellion that must end with a new tsar.

The period from February to November 1917, when there was freedom, was never considered an achievement in Russia. How the "damned nineties" are not considered an achievement now. Even Russian oppositionists make films about how terrible the 1990s were. Believe me, as a person who lived in Moscow at that time, it was an era of real freedom.

Perhaps the Russians do not have a demand for democracy and freedom, because they did not have a long period when they could feel the benefits of such a state?

Or because when we talk about freedom, it is a danger to the empire, which is an absolute value for Russians.

At the same time, the "liberal empire" dreamed of, for example, by Anatoly Chubais, cannot exist. We can all see what a real empire is when it is restored. The question is not that other nations have the right to leave the empire. The question is that they have the right to be equal.

For example, the Catalans cannot leave Spain, no matter how hard they try. However, since this year, Catalan, Basque, and Galician languages have been spoken in the Spanish parliament with an interpreter. Equal rights are guaranteed to all. This is the logic of the development of democracy, but for Russians, it is something terrible.

Today, we cannot imagine a session of the Russian The lower chamber of the Federal Assembly, the bicameral parliament of the Russian Federation.State Duma at which a lawmaker from Tatarstan will take the podium and speak in the Tatar language. But in 1917, at the first constitutive meeting of the State Duma of Russia, legislators from Ukraine spoke in Ukrainian – and their Russian parliamentarian colleagues at the time applauded this, because it was their first period of freedom. They said: "We do not want Ukrainians to separate from us, but we are ready to listen to the Ukrainian language in Petrograd."

Is this the true partnership between nations that Latynina spoke of?

Finally, we found an example of such a partnership in the history of Russia. This partnership lasted for one day. If the Bolsheviks had not carried out a coup then, I suppose that Russia would have begun to transform into a truly federal or confederal state. However, it is not known how the people would have perceived it.

In the 1990s, Russia again began to move in this direction. Then, there was an agreement with Tatarstan and a federal agreement with other Russian republics. However, the majority of the population and the elite did not accept this. They supported the war in Chechnya instead of looking for peaceful ways to settle the situation.

What should happen for Russians to treat Ukrainians as a separate people? When will they perceive Ukraine the way they perceive Poland or Finland?

Never. They will never change their attitude towards Ukrainians. The fact is that Russians never perceived Poles and Finns as Russians. But Ukrainians and Belarusians have always been perceived as such. From the point of view of the political dictionary of the Russian Empire, there was a triune Russian nation consisting of Great Russians, Belarusians, and Little Russians. When the Soviet Union disappeared, so did the Soviet conception of history: Russians simply returned to the pre-communist interpretation of history. And it was exactly like that.

In other words, the Bolsheviks conserved this worldview – put it on hold, but when the Soviet Union collapsed, they returned to the worldview of the Russian Empire, right?

Absolutely. It's just that we and they had different historical processes at the time of conservation. It happens. Therefore, we should not think that the Russians will start treating us differently.

We ourselves must create a model of our participation in the civilized world that will not allow the Russians to destroy us. Let them continue to think that we are a part of the territory cut off from them – it does not matter if we are able to defend it.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

There are many modern countries that lost their historical territories in the 20th century. Look at Germany: they have neither Нині місто-анклав Калінінград у складі російської федерації. До 1945 року було центром німецької провінції Східна Прусія.Königsberg, nor Нині польське місто Ґданськ — столиця Поморського воєводства. До 1945 року було центром німецької провінції Західна Прусія.Danzig, nor Нині польське місто Щецин — столиця Західнопоморського воєводства. До 1945 року було центром німецької провінції Західна Померанія.Stettin, nothing. Or look at Poland. Neither Lviv, nor Vilnius, nor Нині місто в Білорусі, центр однойменної області. До 1944 року належало Польщі.Grodno, nothing. This is how the Russians will live. Without Kyiv, without Kharkiv. Somehow they will survive. The Poles and the Germans survived – they did not die out.

That is, it will only be about whether Ukraine will be able to defend itself? Accordingly, will the Russians be able to translate this historical dispute into the plane of military decisions?

Absolutely right. They will always politically try to prove to us that we do not exist. They will spend money on it, recruit supporters, try to corrupt the elites. This will continue as long as Ukrainians have statehood. If we work on security and carry out reasonable Ukrainization, then they will not succeed here.

In Ukraine, there is an opinion that Russia may disintegrate, as the USSR once disintegrated. How realistic is such a scenario?

Obviously, there is a difference between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union. In the USSR, Russians were a minority, albeit the largest group. In the Russian Federation, they constitute the majority, and they also intensively Russify other peoples.

In fact, Putin led the course to destroy the identity of the peoples of Russia. It was during his rule that the languages of these peoples ceased to be taught in educational institutions. It was during his rule that peoples began to be deprived not only of their language, culture, and literature.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

To think that Russia will fall apart so easily means not to understand that the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union. It is enough to look at the statistics of knowledge of languages by the peoples of Russia to understand a lot.

I do not see any prerequisites for the disintegration of Russia. For example, if the Caucasian republics ever declare their independence, then only under crisis conditions in the entire Russian Federation.

You can look at the Tatarstan mentioned earlier. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the People's Front of Tatarstan operated there, which spoke in fact with the same slogans as the People's Movement of Ukraine. The leaders of the Tatar Soviet Republic were practically the same sovereign communists as the Ukrainian sovereign communists. However, it was more difficult for them to stand up for something on their own, because this is a small republic with a small population. We are in a different situation. It is much more difficult for Russia to fight Ukraine with a population of 40 million.

In 1990, I wrote an article for several Baltic media in which I emphasized that the independence of the Baltic countries would actually take place the day after Ukraine declared its independence. Then the Baltic people took offense at me.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

The Baltic states declared independence earlier — at a time when Ukraine had not yet done so. I explained to them that when a country of 40 million is separated from the empire, it is much more difficult to deal with it than with 1 or 2 million. Therefore, as long as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova stand for independence, nothing threatens the Soviet Union. After all, they could still be forced to stay in the empire by force. But when Ukraine or Kazakhstan declare independence, it's a completely different story. The USSR simply did not have the resources to keep them.

I hope that Ukrainians will not think in terms of the post-Soviet space, because after the Russo-Ukrainian war, the post-Soviet space will no longer exist.

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Will Russia plan to attack other countries after this war? Say Kazakhstan or Georgia.

If Ukraine is defeated, of course. But one must understand a simple thing: Ukraine is one of the few countries of the former USSR where it is necessary to negotiate with society. That is why Putin lost his blitzkrieg. Relatively speaking, there are only a few such countries in the post-Soviet space. We are talking about Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states, and Armenia. Apart from Ukraine, the rest are still small countries.

Other former Soviet republics are countries of one-man power, where it is necessary to negotiate not with the people, but with the first person. And in a situation where Russia wins a war with Ukraine, perhaps these first persons will have the desire to come to an agreement with it themselves, so as not to endanger their power.

Of course, under such conditions, everyone will survive as best they can. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, will try to rely on the support of Turkey, and the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, will count on the support of China.

However, such a scenario will only happen if they are not in real military danger. So for all these leaders, not even for the people, but for the leaders in particular, it is important that Ukraine wins the war. Even Alexander Lukashenko needs this, no matter how paradoxical it sounds. For other countries in Russia's orbit, Ukraine's victory provides a chance to avoid being absorbed in the future.

What is the victory of Ukraine in your understanding?

Victory in war means the preservation of the state.

That is, it is not about the liberation of territories?

If Ukraine can liberate its territories by military means, it will be good. However, the main task is to save the state as a whole.

Will we consider the situation a victory if Ukraine retains statehood, but loses territories and does not join NATO?

If we keep the state, we will at least have a chance to get security guarantees and think about the future. If there is no state – there will be no one to join NATO.

Is there a chance that Ukraine will be offered to join NATO at the Washington Summit in July this year?

I doubt it. In my opinion, the Ukrainian leadership and Ukrainian society have put a lot of effort into this, but this does not mean that we have been heard.

Under what conditions can Ukraine become a member of NATO? What would have to happen for the United States and Germany to reconsider their position?

Complex historical processes have to develop in a favorable way. I do not think that it depends on the change of power in the partner countries. The international situation in the world no longer resembles the situation of the second half of the 20th century with established borders.

If the West becomes convinced that Russia is generally not ready to restore international law, they will try to create a new order there. Ukraine's admission to NATO, even in the absence of our control over the entire border line, is also a possible response to Russia's lawlessness.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

I assume that when the war in Ukraine ends, completely different political processes will begin in the world. Russia understands this very well, which is why they do not want to end these hostilities. However, I cannot tell you how the Ukrainian people will use this window of opportunity.

You have repeatedly said that Vladimir Putin is not an anomaly in the history of Russia, but a person with the outlook of an average Russian. However, many Ukrainians hope that after his death the Russian Federation will come out of the war and change. Is this a real scenario or a dangerous illusion?

This mythological thinking is based on the Soviet experience. It seems to me that people who think like this are guided by the stereotype "Stalin died — things got better" . Of course, after the death of a tyrant of this type, the regime is forced to somehow update itself.

It should be mentioned that there is another perspective: for example, Stalin came after Lenin's death. In an authoritarian regime, no one knows where everything is going. Things got better after Stalin's death, and things got better after Mao Zedong's death. However, this does not always happen; it is not a rule.

If the Chekist regime disappears in Russia — not Putin, but the regime — then at least we will have a window of opportunity. However, I do not guarantee that we will use it correctly.

If the Russians have a persistent demand for an imperial revival that involves the absorption of Ukraine, does that mean they will never stop fighting?

It's not a matter of demand, but of possibilities. If the Russians don't have the resources, they won't fight anyone. Even if Ukraine does not join NATO, but will be in the situation of, say, South Korea. We remember how they behaved when the price of oil was three dollars per barrel –Russia could then afford only minor provocations, no more.

Will the permission to strike Russia with American weapons change the course of the war?

It's a matter of dynamics, and dynamics change constantly. The West hopes that Russia will realize the need to end the war, while Russia only intensifies the escalation.

Nowadays, the knowledge about Russia is slowly changing in the West –and now they can aggravate the situation there too. Because only force can make Russia understand that they do not agree with such an agenda.

A lot can change if Russia continues to deplete and lose resources. And if we can strike at military units in Russia, and they will not respond with anything more serious. It should be understood that Putin has no trump cards left except for nuclear weapons.

I think the Russians are not ready for a nuclear escalation for one simple reason: they see that the Chinese position exists outside the nuclear scenario. This is the main condition under which the Chinese are not ready to support the Russian position.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

Are Putin's nuclear threats still affecting attitudes about war?

Of course, now these threats have less influence than before. It is impossible not to notice. Not so long ago, Ukraine was not allowed to attack Russia with Western weapons at all. It was believed that this was the road to a direct conflict between the West and Russia. Now the position has changed.

Two and a half years ago, we discussed whether the Germans would give us any helmets for the army. And now we are outraged that they do not provide Taurus long-range missiles. Most German politicians also say that Olaf Scholz is wrong when he does not give them. Public opinion there and the position of political elites are changing.Vitaliy Portnikov, political commentator

In February 2022, there was a consensus in Germany on whether serious military support should be provided to Ukraine. And this consensus was not in our favor. And now there is a consensus that Ukraine should be provided with serious weapons — and only the federal chancellor is outside this consensus.

Many such examples can be given. In the winter of 2022, Macron traveled to Moscow to talk with Putin. Now, the French president is talking about placing French troops on the territory of Ukraine and sending military instructors here.

Maybe Macron was traumatized by the famous long table in Moscow? Pointless talk about history instead of talking about politics?

Professional politicians are computers. They do not get injured. They count. If you think that you can reach a politician emotionally, you are hitting an iron door. Macron wants to be the leader of Europe. He is thinking about his legacy — he wants to be remembered not as someone who talked to Putin, but as someone who stood up to Putin.

The French president's term expires in 2027. Is it too early for Macron to raise the stakes in this war?

It seems that this is not the end of the stakeraising. You can introduce troops, not just talk about it. After that, a lot can change as the Russians do not count on this and certainly would not want their missiles to kill French soldiers.

And I am not going to predict the reaction of the French president to the death of French soldiers in Ukraine. We live in a rapidly changing world. But you can safely put yourself in the shoes of the French president and think: what will happen if you leave the deaths of French citizens unanswered. What will France think about it?

Finally, let's return to the beginning of our conversation. Is there a chance that the Russians will ever realize that the days of empires are over – and for the sake of their own development, they need to abandon their imperial views of the world?

Perhaps such an impetus will be the war between Russia and Ukraine. If we win this war.