Starshield disruptions expose Ukraine’s satellite dependence as Europe seeks alternatives and Russia builds its own

Starshield restrictions expose Ukraine’s reliance on US-controlled communications

In mid-September, US President Donald Trump called on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to stop attacking Russian oil refineries, arguing that the strikes were driving up fuel prices in the United States.

"He must stop knocking out diesel fuel in Russia. He's causing a diesel shortage," Trump said during a visit to Ireland.

However, an analysis by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas identified the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a larger contributor to global fuel price increases. The disruption temporarily blocked approximately 5 million barrels per day of petroleum product exports from the Persian Gulf, compared with a reduction of 1.5 million barrels per day in Russian oil refining and petroleum product exports following Ukrainian strikes.

The economists also cited Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, damage to Middle Eastern refineries and export restrictions imposed by China and Russia.

Trump subsequently repeated his criticism of Ukrainian strikes and suggested that Washington could restrict intelligence sharing with Kyiv. SpaceX owner Elon Musk also backed Trump's position, saying Zelenskyy had "gone too far."

On October 14, Ukraine reported that SpaceX had restricted the operation of Starshield terminals, the military satellite communications service used by Ukrainian forces.

Sources in Ukraine's Defense Ministry told hromadske that the restrictions had been imposed unilaterally and without warning. Terminals lost connectivity when equipment exceeded certain speeds, with reported thresholds ranging from approximately 72 to 161 kilometers per hour, depending on the system and military unit.

Connectivity began recovering the following day, but the restrictions were not fully lifted. On October 19, presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said the 160 km/h speed limit remained in place, affecting both jet-powered interceptor drones and an important communications channel used by Ukrainian helicopters to intercept Russian Shahed drones.

Musk said the Starshield terminals belonged to the US government and that restrictions were determined by the American military, with ultimate authority resting with the president. He also argued that the commercial Starlink service should not be used for offensive military operations.

The White House denied deliberately restricting Ukraine's access. According to Axios, administration officials attributed the disruption to a technical malfunction. Reuters, however, reported, citing sources, that the Pentagon had received instructions from the White House to slow Starshield service for Ukrainian forces.

In September 2022, Musk ordered restrictions on Starlink coverage in parts of Kherson Oblast during Ukraine's counteroffensive. In February 2025, Reuters reported that US negotiators had threatened to cut Ukraine's access to Starlink unless Kyiv accepted Washington's terms for a minerals agreement. Musk subsequently said he would never shut down the service, regardless of his disagreements with Ukrainian policy.

Other disruptions in July and September 2025 were part of broader Starlink outages affecting users beyond Ukraine.

For Yurii Fedorenko, commander of Ukraine's Achilles military unit, the problem extends beyond any single outage.

"As you can see, this is a very serious instrument of influence over any of us. You can provide a certain transmission speed, or take it away. You can enable service in certain areas, or remove it," he said at the first Ukrainian-German Defense Forum.

Fedorenko argued that no European country could independently develop a military satellite communications alternative comparable to Starlink.

He called on NATO members to coordinate the production and launch of satellites, with individual countries assuming responsibility for different parts of a shared system.

The challenge, however, is not simply political. It is also technological - and the gap between Starlink and its European competitors remains substantial.

Europe’s Starlink alternatives: What is available and what remains years away

Starlink's dominance comes partly from the scale of its satellite network. Its satellites orbit Earth at an altitude of approximately 550 kilometers, far closer than traditional geostationary satellites operating at around 36,000 kilometers.

That shorter distance reduces signal latency, making the network suitable not only for internet access and video calls but also for transmitting drone footage and supporting other military communications.

As of mid-October 2026, Starlink had approximately 11,150 satellites in orbit. Its closest European competitor, the British-French OneWeb network, operated by Eutelsat, had around 650 - roughly 17 times fewer.

Eutelsat has been negotiating with European governments since March to expand satellite internet services in Ukraine. The European Union plans to increase Ukraine's access to satellite communications through commercial providers beginning in early 2027.

Investors have also taken notice. Eutelsat shares rose 23% on October 14, following the introduction of Starshield restrictions affecting Ukraine.

Another potential interim solution is GOVSATCOM, an EU initiative that pools satellite communications resources from member states and operators to provide secure services for government users.

Unlike Starlink or OneWeb, GOVSATCOM is not a separate satellite constellation. Instead, it provides access to existing communications capacity, prioritizing reliability and security for government operations.

The platform became operational in January 2026. At an October 14 briefing, European Commission representatives confirmed that the EU was discussing Ukraine's potential access to the system.

The EU is also developing IRIS², a multi-orbit satellite network intended to provide secure communications for governments, defense institutions and critical infrastructure, alongside connectivity for businesses and civilians.

Under current plans, the constellation will include 330 satellites in low Earth orbit and another 18 in medium Earth orbit.

The EU is currently developing a multi-layered satellite system, IRIS² . It is intended to provide secure communications for governments, defence and critical infrastructure, as well as internet for businesses and citizens. The system is planned to have 330 satellites in Близько 1200 кілометрів.high-Earth orbit and 18 satellites in Близько 8000 кілометрів.medium-Earth orbit .

Denmark is among the countries actively involved in the project. For Copenhagen, an independent European satellite network would also improve communications at high latitudes, including coverage of remote areas in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

But building such a system requires political decisions, funding and time.

"There are a number of competing projects in this area. They require certain decisions and financing," Danish Ambassador to Ukraine Thomas Lund-Sørensen told hromadske at the Ukrainian-German Defense Conference.

He said companies involved in the project had suggested a two-year timeframe, although he hoped Ukrainian ingenuity and flexibility might help accelerate progress.

"Therefore, I believe we will remain somewhat dependent on Starlink for some time," the ambassador said.

Gediminas Navickas, deputy head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, was more cautious about predicting when a fully operational European alternative would become available.

"The work has been underway for several years, including with European Union funding. A number of decisions have already been made, the first IRIS² satellites are being manufactured, and launches are planned from 2029," he told hromadske.

"Of course, you cannot replace Starlink overnight, but the work has already begun, and much has been accomplished."

Navickas emphasized the importance of cooperation among EU member states and institutions, as well as drawing on Ukraine's experience.

For now, he said, no one could say precisely when a fully deployed European system would match existing capabilities.

Europe's efforts may eventually reduce Ukraine's dependence on American satellite communications. But while those alternatives are still being developed, Russia is pursuing a satellite network of its own - one that Ukrainian military officials warn could create a different kind of threat.

Russia’s Rassvet satellite network and the war moving underground

While Europe searches for alternatives to Starlink, Russia is developing its own low-Earth-orbit satellite communications network, known as Rassvet.

The project is intended to provide capabilities similar to those offered by Starlink, potentially allowing Russian forces to maintain satellite communications for drones and other military equipment without relying on foreign infrastructure.

Russia launched its first Rassvet satellites in March and July 2026. Of the 32 spacecraft sent into orbit, at least one has already been lost, according to Rassvet Tracker, a service monitoring their altitude and orbital positions.

Moscow plans to expand the constellation to 292 satellites in 2027 and eventually 924 by 2035. Those figures remain targets rather than operational capabilities.

Ukrainian military officials warn that a functioning Russian satellite network could significantly expand Moscow's ability to conduct drone attacks.

"One way or another, Russia will acquire Rassvet satellite communications. And this will be a tremendous problem not only for Ukraine," said Yurii Fedorenko, commander of the Achilles unit.

He argued that Ukraine and its allies must develop electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting the Russian network, just as Russia has learned to interfere with Starlink.

Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, has raised similar concerns.

"The main threat is that we currently cannot use Starlink to control UAVs online over Russia. It does not work there. But the Russians will be able to attack our entire country using UAVs controlled online through their own satellites," he wrote on Facebook.

Ukraine is also pursuing diplomatic measures to limit the potential threat.

Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk, Ukraine's permanent representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva, told journalists that Kyiv was working to prevent Russian satellites from operating over Ukrainian territory.

In August 2026, Ukraine formally appealed to the International Telecommunication Union, asking it not to allocate frequencies for the Russian military satellite communications system over Ukraine's sovereign territory.

However, the ITU cannot physically disable satellites or prevent them from passing over a country's territory. Any regulatory restrictions would therefore differ fundamentally from the technical ability to block satellite communications.

For Ukrainian forces, the implications extend beyond satellite connectivity itself.

Fedorenko argues that increasingly capable drones, longer strike ranges and the prospect of more reliable satellite-controlled systems are making previously safer areas vulnerable to attack.

"The war is moving from the skies underground. The underground party is beginning," he said.

He warned that Ukrainian troops would need to develop underground routes connecting artillery positions, drone operating sites and evacuation points for wounded personnel.

"If we do not learn to quickly dig underground communication routes, at least to our artillery positions, our drone positions and the places from which we can evacuate the wounded, the enemy will do it," Fedorenko said.

According to the commander, Russian forces are already developing underground military infrastructure, drawing on North Korea's experience with extensive tunnel networks and fortified positions.

He said North Korean troops had shared principles of underground warfare with Russia, which subsequently expanded its military engineering forces.

"They have started digging underground. And now we can see from Russian sources that they are moving toward us underground, where it is almost impossible to reach them," Fedorenko said.

In late September, Russian President Vladimir Putin increased the authorized size of Russia's armed forces for the fourth time in 2026, bringing the total establishment, including civilian personnel, to nearly 2.44 million people. More than 1.55 million of those positions are designated for military personnel.

The largest increase came in July, when 25,000 personnel were added, some of them assigned to newly established military construction units.

For Ukraine, the challenge is increasingly twofold: securing reliable communications in the skies while adapting its defenses to a battlefield where improved surveillance and long-range strikes are driving more military activity underground.