Prigozhin's growing influence poses challenge to Putin's authority — American analyst Rob Lee

The Ukrainian army continues to develop a counteroffensive to push the Russian forces out of the country. After the liberation of some settlements in the south of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that “counteroffensive actions are not easy,” but promised results as “in the fall” — meaning the liberation of Kherson earlier in November 2022.

While the Ukrainians are launching an offensive against the Russians, one of the Russian warlords tried to launch a mutiny against Moscow. The leader of the Wagner mercenaries Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to undermine the authorities in Russia. Although he was forced to retreat, it raised questions not only about his own future but also about the future of Ukraine’s counteroffensive campaign.

hromadske discussed the mutiny in Russia and the war in Ukraine with Rob Lee, a former Marine officer and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He actively follows Russia's military strategy and says that although the Ukrainian army is not advancing quickly, as it was in Kharkiv Oblast, this should have been expected. Lee actively follows Russia's military strategy and has 650,000 Twitter followers.

"Now he is a potential threat to Putin himself"

Interviewer: So what happened in Russia and what, in your opinion, was Prigozhin trying to achieve?

Rob Lee: I think the catalyst of what happened was earlier in June when the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that all volunteer units or private military companies would have to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense. This would essentially subordinate them to the Russian Ministry of Defense because that's where the payments would come from. After the announcement happened, Prigozhin came out and said: “You know, we're not going to do this.” There's always been this constant battle going on between Prigozhin and Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defense, and Gerasimov, [the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces], but it isn't always clear whose side Putin takes, and so that's what decides which one wins out.

I think basically when the Russian M.O.D. made that announcement, in hindsight,

we can say that Putin basically supported this view, and that's why Prigozhin felt he had to do something drastic because otherwise Wagner was going to be subordinated to the M.O.D. and it wouldn't be clear what his role would be. And he doesn't want to be subordinate to Shoigu and Gerasimov. So I think he was trying to force the issue and maybe get in contact with Putin and Putin was not responding to him. And this is his way of getting Putin's attention.

I don't think the purpose was to overthrow Putin. They would have done this very differently. They announced it before they went into Rostov that Prigozhin declared war on the M.O.D — it's a very high publicity thing. And it's not what you want to do in a coup if you're so far from Moscow. This is a factual dispute between important Russian figures that got out of hand.

And it became a challenge to Putin himself. Once Prigozhin went into Russia, once he occupied a city, it was beyond just the normal kind of dispute. And especially once Putin released that statement calling it a betrayal. And that was a really significant challenge to Putin. I don't think there's been anything like this since Putin has been in office. Every other time there's been someone who's tried to be a domestic competitor for him or they would resist — like Navalny, like Khodorkovsky — they went to jail. This case is a unique case. I'm not sure what all the implications would be, but it's certainly very significant.

So I guess it means that Prigozhin is a loser in this game and Putin will never forgive him, will he? How does it end for Prigozhin?

I don't know. It's a short answer. I think that everyone comes off weaker from this position.

Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense both look quite weak. It was a challenge to them and Prigozhin wasn't crushed. And obviously the footage from Rostov, a number of people kind of celebrating Wagner being there — that is all very bad for Putin, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the regime itself.

But for Prigozhin, it was never clear what the long-term solution for him was going to be.

He wasn't trying to replace Putin. I don't think he's in a position to do that, but he did directly challenge Putin. So now he is a potential threat to Putin himself which means he put a target on his back. Even if there was some short-term arrangement that they reached where there's some short-term limited success, long-term I don't think it's going to work out for him. I think what we're gonna see is the Russian security services, the Russian Ministry of Defense, all of them are very busy with the war, so they couldn't necessarily respond that effectively to this, but all of them are going to look at how can they weaken Wagner, or how can they push out Prigozhin and put someone in charge that is loyal to them.

How will the attempted mutiny affect the war in Ukraine in general and the counteroffensive in particular?

It is unclear if this will have a direct effect on the counter-offensive, as most of Wagner's units do not hold any front lines. I'm not sure what role they played. I believe that the majority was recalled back to Rostov. There is no "Wagner" in Zaporizhzhia and in the south of the Donetsk region. In those areas where the fighting is at its peak, and even in Bakhmut, the Ministry of Defense replaced them more than three weeks ago.

The question arises how this war will end. One option is an internal threat to Putin's rule. A week ago, I would have said that this is not the most likely event. At this point, it is still unclear whether Putin will be ousted. In Russia itself, there may be a certain internal threat that will affect the general offensive.

The tension between Wagner and the Ministry of Defense is actually considerable now. "Wagner" shot down seven or eight planes and killed many Russian aviators. PVC has its own aviation component. Probably their pilots knew those pilots who died. Will the Russian Air Force want to support them? What will they look like in the future? Many really important questions, the answers to which are not entirely clear.

In the long run, this could really have a significant impact on the war because it shows some weakness in the Russian regime. How weak he is, I don't know.

Does it mean that we won’t see Wagner mercenaries in Ukraine anymore?

It was never clear what Wagner's role would be after Bakhmut. Basically, Wagner's been doing almost nothing else but Bakhmut since August time frame. In some ways, I think Prigozhin might've been happy just focusing back on Africa because he started using convicts. I think there was an issue for him where the professional Wagner fighters, are a means of gaining profit for him, and they're important for his operations in Africa and elsewhere. He cares more about them than the Russian Ministry of Defense cares about its soldiers. Losing too many of these guys threatens his empire elsewhere. I think that was always an issue. And Ukraine was never lucrative for Prigozhin. It was something he had to do and maybe as a way of gaining political power but not profitable.

It was never clear what role they would play in this counteroffensive on Ukraine. Overall, the war's not going that well for Russia. And I think for Wagner, it is a question if they want to still be associated with this.

How will the attempted mutiny affect the war in Ukraine in general and the counteroffensive in particular?

It's not clear there will be a direct effect on the counteroffensive because most Wagner units are not holding any of the front lines. I'm not sure what role they were playing. I think that most have been pulled back to Rostov which is why they could kind of go into Rostov and elsewhere in numbers. So I'm not sure I have any direct effect on the counter-offensive. There is no Wagner presence in Zaporizhzhya Oblast and in southern Donetsk Oblast. Those areas where a peak of the fighting is doesn't really affect that much and even in Bakhmut, the Ministry of Defense replaced them over three weeks ago.

There is a question of how this war ends. One of the ways it could end is if there's some kind of domestic threat to Putin's rule. A week ago, I would have said that was not the most likely event. At this point, it's still not clear that Putin's going to fall or anything like that. There could be some domestic threat in Russia itself that affects the overall offensive.

The tensions between Wagner and the Ministry of Defense are now really significant. Obviously, Wagner shot down seven or eight aircraft and killed quite a number of Russian airmen. Wagner has its own air component. Those pilots probably knew some of the pilots that were killed. Is the Russian Air Force going to want to support them? How will they be viewed going forward? A lot of really significant questions and it's not really clear.

Long-term, it could have a really significant effect on the war because it also shows a certain weakness in the Russian regime. How weak that is, I don't know.

However, some people speculate that Prigozhin might attack Ukraine from the north, from Belarus. Do you find this scenario possible?

Not in the near term. Wagner depends on the Russian Ministry of Defense. They have a lot of their own capabilities but they get their ammunition from the M.O.D. I don't think starting an offensive from Belarus makes that much sense because if they make a move for Kyiv, they're not going to take Kyiv. They'll lose a lot of numbers and it will also be unsuccessful.

And of course, does the Russian government want to rely on Wagner the same way it was before? I think that relationship is permanently changed.

“There will never be ideal circumstances for the offensive, Ukraine had to begin at some point”

Do you think Ukraine has enough equipment now to be successful on the battlefield?

It's a difficult question to answer. It depends on what you mean by having success. If the standard is to retake all the terrain that Russia currently occupies, that's not clear. I think without air superiority, it's going to always be difficult. We know that Ukraine is supposed to be getting F-16 fighters at some point. That will help provide an additional kind of capability that Ukraine kind of lacks right now. But they are already using new equipment. We’ve seen Leopard tanks, we’ve seen Bradleys. From what I'm hearing, they're performing well, it gives Ukrainian forces an advantage. They're more survivable. So there’re number of cases where Bradleys or Leopards have been struck by anti-tank systems and soldiers have survived so they can continue fighting, which is very important.

So I think they have the equipment for this offensive. Part of this comes down to the fact that Ukraine can't wait forever to start an offensive. They have to go at some point when there are obvious expectations. And of course, there's a lot of Ukraine that is still occupied, and Ukrainians for good reason want to liberate those areas and liberate their families and friends who are in these occupied areas. It was never possible to have the ideal circumstances for the offensive, Ukraine had to begin at some point. I think the timing may have been affected by the delivery of Storm Shadow cruise missiles from the UK.

The Russian military indeed built sophisticated defenses. We saw from the satellite images that the Russians created layers of fortifications, for example, between the occupied towns of Polohy and Tokmak. And this is still coming for the Ukrainian army. How difficult will it be for the Ukrainians to break through this? Is it possible?

Yes, but I think the issue is that people thought Kharkiv was a potential template to apply to this offensive. And it was never going to be that way just because in Kharkiv Russian forces were very weak, they hadn't really entrenched very well.

The issue is that even if Ukraine can have a small breakthrough and breaches the first-line defenses, then it's easy for Russia to reconsolidate around the next-line defenses. And there's no fast way going through mines.

The issue is if you look at what's going on in the south, it's been slow so far. Ukrainian forces still aren't at the main defensive line that Russia set up. In some directions, I think it's more than 15 kilometers away. There's potential that the heaviest and most difficult fight Ukraine will face itself may not come until they reach that line. I think that's going to affect the basic decision-making for Ukraine's senior leadership. It's very clear that Ukraine has committed new brigades for this operation. We've seen the 47th mechanized brigade with Bradleys and other equipment. We’ve seen the 37th marine brigade and some other ones down there. But it's very clear that some of the other new brigades have not been committed and it's obvious that Ukraine still has a large amount of forces and reserves. So it is a question about where they will commit them.

So basically, the people out there shouldn't expect that the Ukrainian military will reach Tokmak, Melitopol, or Mariupol in the next weeks.

This offensive may happen over a month or two months, it might be a slow process. And I think that's what we might see in this case where if Ukraine’s military decides to focus its main effort somewhere else than the south, maybe, this could be around Bakhmut, could be Luhansk, Vuhledar, further east of Zaporizhzhya. But if it is south, we might see a week of heavy artillery bombardment, then Ukraine makes some gains, and then this kind of slow process where they eventually get to Tokmak or elsewhere but not immediately. And ultimately, even when Ukraine makes gains, you're not going to probably see all Russian forces collapse. So Ukraine can’t just drive dozens of kilometers in a day. That's very unlikely to ever happen.

"It was obvious this offensive will not be easy"

What can we say about the ongoing offensive? Is it too early to assess how successful it is, or it will be?

I think it's too early. I think probably the expectation was that forces would have advanced further than they have so far. And so, ultimately, if the units currently fight, they can't get to the main defensive line.

So I think it's important to wait. And ultimately, we know that Ukraine is using a lot of artillery now. There's clearly a lot of attrition on the Russian side. We can't always see this because we only get a very limited kind of understanding of what's going on in the war because we only see the videos posted, and we know that the Ukrainian units are deliberately not posting most of their footage right now.

I think what's happening is within the realm of expectations, what we should have had for this offensive — that it was always going to be difficult.

How about the equipment? In the early stages, the Russians published pictures of the damaged and abandoned Ukrainian Leopards, Bradleys, which led some people to speculate about the heavy losses on the Ukrainian side in terms of equipment. How bad are they? What can you say about that?

I think what was useful to keep in mind is that Ukraine for this offensive built up nine brigades and then some additional units from the National Guard and other kinds of more experienced brigades that were pulled back to kind of train up for this offensive. The photos from that one event showed a company's worth of vehicles that were lost. Each brigade has several battalions, each battalion has several companies. So, we saw in those photos just one company's worth of losses out of 9+ brigades. It was certainly not insignificant. There was some important equipment that was lost. But there's always going to be losses. There's no way of breaching defenses without losing units, without losing personnel.

But one thing we saw from those videos is that most of those Bradleys and Leopards appear as though they're just mobility kills. The tracks were destroyed, maybe they hit a mine. But I've seen the crew compartment was fine. I think the crews likely survived. I think what’s really important to consider is that a lot of the crew members survived, and probably keep fighting.

“This counter-offensive is probably not going to end the war”

You co-authored a piece with Michael Kofman about the Ukrainian offensive and it's my understanding that you don't believe the war will end in 2023. Why do you think so?

We thought that this counter-offensive was probably not going to end the war. There was a concern before this offensive that the expectations were becoming very high and that people were saying it was going to be like Kharkiv again. We have even more units so we can take back Crimea and so on. I didn't think that was a realistic expectation and I think there's always a problem politically about having the right expectations because in the U.S. there's always a debate about should the U.S. keep providing equipment or should the U.S. force Ukraine to negotiate. It's very clear from my view that Ukrainians don't want to negotiate right now and they're not ready to give away their territory.

Ukraine was definitely going to make gains, right? And we've seen that. There was a question about will these be tactical gains or will they be operational or strategic-level gains. That was not clear to me. But the overall idea was that it was unlikely that Ukraine was going to be able to take back all the Donbas and all of the Crimea in this offensive because even if Russian forces collapse in one area, it would be very, very difficult.

And so there's a risk that if Ukraine did not live up to impossible expectations, then people say, “Okay, this war is a stalemate, there's no point in supporting Ukraine.”

In our view there's a lot of focus on this counteroffensive, but not much focus afterward.

I think the war is probably not going to end this year. It's hard to predict these things, obviously, but I think it's probably going into 2024 at least, and it could go into 2025. It could go on for a long time.

And finally, what will be considered a success for Ukraine? What is the endpoint of the war? Are we still talking about liberating Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, even if we are talking about two years from now?

You'd be better to answer that than I would be because I'm not Ukrainian. And ultimately, this comes down to the political goals that Ukraine wants to achieve and what Ukrainians want to achieve. And one of the things I hear when there are debates about Western support is that even if Western support goes down, Ukrainians are going to keep fighting for good reason. They've kind of seen what's happened, all these kinds of atrocities that have been committed in this war. I don't know what the end state will be.

It's not certain to me that Ukraine will be able to take back all its territory. A lot of this comes down to how much Western support it receives, right? If they receive F-16s, other new capabilities, and enough ammunitions to use them that could be a significant factor. It's really hard to predict things going more than a few months in advance. So what happens next year? Will Ukraine be able to build a new force for a counter-offensive next year? Maybe. I don't know. Maybe Russia will run штещ issues. A lot of things are possible. I don't have firm predictions, but it is possible that this will end in a negotiated settlement at some point if both sides get exhausted.

At the end of the day, Russia's forces could collapse. We've seen the Ukraine forces have performed very well in this war. So I certainly wouldn't account for the matter or say they're unable to retake what's rightly their territory but if Russia can defend in a competent way, which they are right now, it will be difficult, unless they get enough Washington support to give them the right advantages.