Ukraine is getting better at stopping Russia's jet-powered Shahed drones. Why are they still a growing threat?

From 350 to 3,500 in three months

Russia launched approximately 350 jet-powered drones against Ukraine in June, 1,500 in July, 2,800 in August and more than 3,500 in September, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat said on October 7.

Unlike conventional Shahed-136 drones, which use piston engines and typically cruise at around 180 kilometers per hour (112 mph), newer jet-powered models can travel several times faster.

According to Ukraine's military intelligence agency, the Russian Geran-5 has a cruising speed of 450–600 kilometers per hour (280–373 mph), a maximum flight altitude of six kilometers (3.7 miles) and an estimated range of up to 950 kilometers (590 miles).

The agency said the drone has been observed operating at altitudes between 200 meters and three kilometers - considerably lower than its maximum ceiling.

The speed difference leaves Ukrainian defenders much less time to detect, track and intercept incoming drones. It also makes many of the weapons traditionally used against slower Shaheds less effective.

Separately. Russia also deploys the Banderol, a hybrid between a kamikaze drone and a cruise missile, which can reach speeds of around 650 kilometers per hour (404 mph).

Ukraine is learning to intercept them - but supplies are limited

Ukraine initially struggled to counter the faster drones. Its forces intercepted approximately 40% of jet-powered targets in July and 60% in August, according to Ihnat.

On September 28, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine was intercepting 57% of jet-powered Shaheds, compared with an overall interception rate of 70% for all drones.

By October 13, Ihnat reported that interception rates had reached as high as 85% on some recent days, reflecting improvements in Ukrainian tactics and experience. The figure, however, represents individual daily results rather than a sustained average.

Yet greater effectiveness does not necessarily mean greater protection.

Ihnat warned that Ukraine's available stocks of missiles and other interceptors were not growing sufficiently to meet demand, while Russia was launching increasing numbers of drones.

Even a handful of successful strikes can cause significant damage. As Ihnat pointed out, five to ten drones reaching their targets out of every hundred launched may still have serious consequences.

One possible answer to Russia's jet-powered drones is to build jet-powered interceptors capable of catching them. But this creates a new problem: cost.

Serhiy Rakhmanin, a member of Ukraine's parliamentary committee on national security and defense, warns that jet engines are substantially more expensive than conventional propulsion systems. If an interceptor costs roughly as much as the incoming drone — and several interceptors must be launched to ensure a successful hit - the economics quickly become unsustainable.

Ukraine also faces limited supplies of air defense missiles capable of engaging fast-moving targets. Medium-range systems and fighter aircraft can intercept such drones, but their ammunition is needed to defend against more destructive threats, including Russian cruise missiles.

The challenge is therefore not simply to develop a faster weapon. It is to find a way to intercept large numbers of relatively inexpensive targets without exhausting the weapons and resources needed for other missions.

Detection may matter more than speed

Ukrainian drone warfare specialists say the decisive factor is often not the interceptor's maximum speed but how early an incoming target can be detected and tracked.

Oleksandr Karpiuk, a former member of the Ukrainian military's unmanned systems units, compares an interceptor to a bullet and the detection system to a rifle scope.

Even an effective weapon is of limited use if it cannot be guided toward its target accurately and in time.

According to Karpiuk, improvements in early detection and tracking are already allowing some conventional propeller-driven interceptors to destroy faster jet-powered drones by approaching them along an interception course rather than pursuing them from behind.

Aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi argues that an effective defense requires an integrated network of radar, acoustic, visual and thermal sensors linked to different types of interceptors.

Such a system can identify an incoming drone, calculate its likely flight path and direct the most suitable weapon toward an interception point.

This matters because an interceptor does not necessarily have to fly faster than its target. If it reaches the right location at the right moment, even a slower drone may be able to destroy a faster one.

Ukraine is developing jet-powered interceptors of its own, but experts emphasize that no single weapon can provide a complete solution. The effectiveness of air defense increasingly depends on how well detection, tracking, electronic warfare and interception systems work together.

The economics of interception

Building faster interceptors is only part of the solution. Ukraine also needs to produce them in sufficient numbers - and at a sustainable cost.

According to Ukrainian defense technology initiative Brave1, small turbojet engines suitable for drone interceptors cost approximately $5,000–$8,000 each, while electric ducted fans are roughly eight times cheaper.

That price difference is one reason Ukraine is pursuing several approaches simultaneously, including turbojet-powered interceptors, electric ducted-fan designs and high-speed electric multicopters.

Engine production itself has become a strategic priority.

Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara said on October 10 that Ukraine was supporting around 20 domestic engine manufacturers across three main categories. For one engine type, projected demand could reach 10,000 units per month in 2027, he said.

Six Ukrainian private companies were already producing turbojet engines as of September, according to Brave1.

The challenge is not merely to develop a weapon capable of destroying a fast-moving drone. Ukraine must also build an industrial base that can supply thousands of affordable interceptors without diverting scarce air defense missiles from other threats.

Ukrainian interceptors are beginning to prove themselves

Ukraine is testing several types of high-speed drone interceptors, with some already recording successful engagements against Russian jet-powered weapons.

On October 8, a Ukrainian air defense crew known as Spalakh, from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade, destroyed a Russian Geran-5 over Chernihiv Oblast using a jet-powered interceptor supplied by the Serhiy Prytula Foundation.

According to the foundation, the Russian drone was traveling at approximately 430 kilometers per hour (267 mph) at an altitude of 780 meters (2,560 feet). It was the second such interception reported using equipment supplied by the foundation.

Other Ukrainian developers are pursuing different designs.

Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi has reported that the SPYS interceptor developed by WIY Drones had destroyed a Geran-5. However, the Russian drone was reportedly traveling at around 200 kilometers per hour, possibly because of an engine malfunction. The manufacturer says SPYS is capable of intercepting targets traveling at up to 600 kilometers per hour.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian developer Mykhailo Fedorov said a newly developed interceptor had destroyed two Geran-5 drones approaching Kyiv during combat tests conducted by Lasar's Group.

Not all of these systems rely on jet propulsion. The Ukrainian-made Zorelit v5, a four-motor interceptor, has reportedly reached a peak speed of 416 kilometers per hour (258 mph), according to its developer. It is undergoing combat testing, but the manufacturer has not yet reported confirmed interceptions in the account reviewed.

The different approaches illustrate Ukraine's efforts to find a scalable defense against Russia's faster drones. However, successful individual interceptions do not yet amount to a comprehensive solution.

Crews are still gaining experience, while manufacturers use combat feedback to improve their designs and prepare for larger-scale production.

How Russia's drones navigate through electronic warfare

Speed is not the only challenge posed by Russia's newer attack drones. Their navigation and communications systems are also becoming more sophisticated, complicating Ukraine's efforts to disrupt them through electronic warfare.

Ukrainian military intelligence has identified several navigation and communications components inside the Russian Geran-5, including a Kometa-M12 satellite navigation antenna, an inertial navigation system, cellular communications equipment and a Chinese-made Xingkai Tech XK-F358 MESH modem.

These systems serve different purposes.

Satellite navigation allows a drone to determine its position, while inertial navigation can help it continue along a planned route when satellite signals are disrupted, although accuracy may deteriorate over time.

A mesh network, meanwhile, can allow equipped drones to exchange information and relay communications through one another, potentially extending connectivity beyond the range of a direct radio link.

That does not mean every Geran-5 operates as part of a functioning mesh network. Ukrainian intelligence has confirmed the presence of mesh-capable hardware, but that alone does not establish how extensively Russia uses the capability in combat.

Serhiy Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine's president on defense technology development who is widely known by his callsign Flash, believes Russia may be operating a small number of covert mesh-network relay stations inside Kyiv.

Beskrestnov estimates that between one and three such stations could provide temporary communications links allowing Russian operators to adjust Shahed drones' flight paths during attacks.

He bases his assessment on an analysis of strikes against a Ukrainian Security Service facility and Kyiv's bridges, including an incident in which, he says, no other Shahed drones were airborne to relay communications.

Beskrestnov argues that such links could allow Russia to make last-minute targeting adjustments despite Ukrainian electronic warfare measures. However, the existence of the suspected relay stations has not been independently confirmed, and their locations remain unknown.

Electronic warfare adds another layer of complexity.

Ukrainian systems can interfere with satellite navigation and radio communications, but disrupting one signal does not necessarily disable every navigation or communications system aboard a drone.

The result is a continuing technological contest: Russia is trying to make its drones more resilient to interference, while Ukraine is developing ways to detect, disrupt and intercept them before they reach their targets.

Why Kyiv's bridges are a particular concern

The possibility of more precise, remotely adjusted drone strikes has raised concerns about Kyiv's bridges, which connect the two banks of the Dnipro River and are essential to the Ukrainian capital's transport network.

However, damaging a bridge and destroying it are two very different things.

Transport planning expert Dmytro Bespalov argues that the relatively small warheads carried by individual attack drones are unlikely to bring down Kyiv's major bridges. That does not mean the bridges are immune to damage or disruption.

Even a strike that leaves a bridge structurally intact could force authorities to close it temporarily for inspections, repairs or safety reasons.

For Kyiv, such closures could have consequences far beyond the immediate damage.

According to Bespalov's estimates, around 40% of the city's residents live on the eastern, or left, bank of the Dnipro, while approximately 80% of jobs are concentrated on the western, or right, bank.

This imbalance makes cross-river connections especially important for commuters.

Bespalov warns that serious disruption to bridge traffic could turn journeys that normally take around 45 minutes into trips lasting two or even three hours, depending on the extent of the closures and the availability of alternative routes.

The greater risk, therefore, may not be the collapse of a bridge but the disruption of a transport system on which hundreds of thousands of residents depend.

These are hypothetical scenarios, not predictions that Kyiv's bridges will be destroyed or closed. But they illustrate why even limited damage to critical infrastructure can have consequences extending well beyond the site of an attack.

A race between adaptation and scale

Ukraine's response to Russia's jet-powered drones is evolving rapidly. New interceptors are already recording successful engagements, while military crews and manufacturers are using battlefield experience to refine the technology.

But the challenge extends beyond developing a drone fast enough to catch another drone. Effective defense also depends on early detection, reliable tracking, coordination between different air defense systems and the ability to manufacture interceptors in sufficient numbers at an affordable cost.

Russia, meanwhile, has demonstrated how quickly it can expand the use of jet-powered weapons. Ukrainian Air Force figures indicate that their deployment increased roughly tenfold between June and September.

Ukraine's improving interception rates show that the new threat can be countered. Yet even a relatively small number of drones reaching their targets can cause serious damage - particularly when critical infrastructure is involved.

The outcome of this technological contest may depend less on any single breakthrough than on how quickly Ukraine can turn successful battlefield experiments into a coordinated, affordable defense system operating at scale.