Unrecognized ‘Transnistria’ asks Russia for ‘help’. What it means

The separatist enclave sandwiched between Ukraine and Moldova has been in the headlines again since last week. This is due to a rare event — a “congress of deputies of all levels”, i.e. members of the so-called parliament, as well as district, city, town, and village councils of the self-proclaimed “Transnistria”.

An extraordinary decision was expected at the “congress” — the seventh since the existence of this unrecognized country. The last time, in 2006, such a decision was a “referendum” on joining Russia (of course, not recognized by anyone). And now, as it was alleged, “Transnistrian deputies” may “ask” to join the Russian Federation and contribute to the crisis right next to Ukraine's borders.

What happened in Tiraspol on February 28, why the “Congress of Deputies of Transnistria” did not end as dramatically as expected, and what else can be expected from Russia — find out in the article by hromadske.

What is “Transnistria”?

What is now referred to as “Transnistria” is the self-proclaimed “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” (“TMR”), a strip of land along the left bank of the Dniester River between Ukraine and the rest of Moldova.

The origins of the current “TMR” lie in the Soviet era, when the pseudo-state formed its own local elite, and its ethnic composition — approximately equal parts Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian — was markedly different from the rest of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. Another equally important factor was the 14th Soviet (later Russian) Army stationed in the “Transnistrian capital” of Tiraspol.

In the late 1980s, the A common name for political and economic reforms in the USSR in 1985-1991. In particular, during perestroika, some political prisoners were rehabilitated and freedom of speech was partially allowed.“perestroika” in the Soviet Union gave impetus to the declaration of independence by the republics dependent on it — the Moldavian SSR was no exception. At that time, the idea of unification with Romania was widespread among the Moldovan elite (their peoples have a long common history and a common language), which the Tiraspol elite was not satisfied with due to the aforementioned differences.

In 1992, these differences escalated into a several-month war between Chişinău and Tiraspol, with the aforementioned 14th Russian Army on the latter's side. Eventually, in July of that year, the parties signed an agreement to resolve the conflict, in which Russia became a “mediator”.

Since then, the Transnistrian conflict has been de facto frozen. A so-called security zone was created along the Dniester, where a joint “peacekeeping mission” of Russia and Moldova operates. The “5+2” negotiation format was established (parties to the conflict — Moldova and Transnistria; mediators — Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE; observers — the United States and the EU), within which several never implemented settlement plans were put forward. And the Russian 14th Army continues to remain there despite its 1992 promises to withdraw from the “TMR”.

How does Russia and the war affect “Transnistria”?

During its separation from Moldova, “Transnistria” has acquired its own de facto authorities: it has its own “constitution”, its own “president” and “parliament”, even its own “currency”, the Transnistrian ruble, and its official languages are A Cyrillic variant of Romanian that appeared in the Moldovan SSR during the Soviet era. Today, Chişinău has finally abandoned the name “Moldovan language”, as Ukraine has recently done.“Moldovan”, Ukrainian, and Russian.

“Transnistria” was and is economically extremely dependent on Russia, or rather, on Russian gas, which was used by the enterprises there that were preserved from the Soviet era. And The capital of MoldovaChişinău has long been interested in this dependence, as it received free electricity generated at the Kuchurgan thermal power plant in the south of “Transnistria”. At the same time, the debt for gas from Moscow was recorded on Moldova, and only the current government has taken on both the dependence on “Transnistrian” electricity and the debt to Gazprom.

Of course, Russian propaganda is strong in the “PMR”. The local population actually watches only Russian TV channels.

It is not surprising that in 2006, “Transnistria” organized a “referendum” in which 97% of the population declared their desire to join the Russian Federation. But it is also not surprising that the results of an incomprehensible vote in a country that is not recognized by anyone (including Russia itself) have not been recognized by any country in the world.

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, “Transnistria” has found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, at the beginning of the active phase of the war, Russian troops in the “PMR” were seen as a potential threat to Ukraine. On the other hand, their number (exact figures are unknown, but the contingent probably does not exceed two thousand) and combat capability (outdated Soviet equipment, lack of experience) raise serious questions: what if the 14th Army is defeated and “Transnistria” will cease to exist?

Therefore, the “Transnistrian” authorities resorted to provocations, such as unexplained explosions in April 2022, and banal propaganda about saboteurs being trained by Chişinău and Kyiv for sabotage against Tiraspol.

The seventh “Congress of deputies of all levels of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” held on February 28, 2024, should be viewed in this light.

What happened at the “Congress of Deputies of Transnistria”?

The Congress had a formal and very specific reason. On January 1, Moldova abolished tax privileges for “Transnistrian” companies to equalize their rights with companies in the rest of Moldova. This is a logical step for a country that seeks peaceful reintegration. But for a region with a dead economy dependent on Russia, it is a painful blow.

And last year, Moldova adopted amendments to the criminal code on liability for separatism and espionage, which Tiraspol presented as Chişinău's intention to imprison almost every Transnistrian (which is not true).

There were expectations that the “Congress of Transnistrian deputies” would adopt an appeal to the Russian authorities to include the region in the Russian Federation. Given Tiraspol's dependence on the Kremlin, it cannot be ruled out that the scenario of asking for “joining Russia” was indeed a possibility.

The final declaration of the “congress” indeed does not lack harsh and even openly pathetic wording such as “Moldova has actually unleashed an economic war against our people.” But in fact, it only decided to ask the Russian “parliament” to “implement diplomatic measures to protect ‘Transnistria’ in the face of Moldova's increasing pressure.” And also to ask international institutions to “influence the leadership of Moldova to return to an adequate dialogue and stop violations of the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of ‘Transnistria’”.

Why did the appeal turn out to be so streamlined?

First, nothing has actually changed in “Transnistria” since 2006, when the “PMR” held a referendum on “joining Russia”. Formally speaking, the “congress” was not supposed to adopt any new request. But, interestingly, the declaration makes no mention of this “referendum” or indeed of the “PMR's” desire to be part of Russia in general.

Secondly, even if “Transnistria” were to ask Russia to join again, this step would not make practical sense. After all, the enclave borders only Moldova and Ukraine, and Russian forces have no access to it, while the combat capability of the 14th Army already present in the region raises significant questions.

Therefore, it is possible that in the event of a real military provocation by “Transnistria”, its reintegration with Moldova would be quickly completed with the help of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

How are people reacting to the “congress” and what can we expect next?

Chişinău has consistently emphasized that it sees no reason for the escalation in unrecognized “Transnistria”.

Moldova's Bureau for Reintegration, which is responsible for dialogue with Tiraspol, called the statement of the “Transnistrian deputies” about oppression “a propaganda declaration” and reminded that the Transnistrian region enjoys “the benefits of policies of peace, security and economic integration with the European Union, which are favorable for all citizens.”

Moldovan President Maia Sanduwas more unequivocal, emphasizing Russia's role in spreading rumors about the “possible annexation of Transnistria”.

“The Kremlin is doing this to intimidate Moldovans. Moreover, this is an election year. The Kremlin wants us to be scared, to be spineless, to be ruled by corrupt officials, and to be able to negotiate with them by bribing politicians, as has been the case for many years. We cannot allow them to do this. We must keep the peace,” thePresident said.

Statements from the Ukrainian side also pointed to the Kremlin's interest in regional destabilization.

For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine emphasized the unviability of the 5+2 format due to the presence of the aggressor state.

“Ukraine continues to advocate for the earliest possible withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Transnistrian region of Moldova, the disposal of ammunition at the warehouses in Kovbasna, and the reformatting of the mission on the Dniester from a military to a civilian one,” the ministry added.

Andrii Yusov, a representative of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, was even more concise: “Today, given the situation in the ‘PMR’, nothing happened. Russia did not get the desired result. In this situation, their efforts, both political and informational, have been defeated.”

As expected, the Western powers emphasized their support for Moldova's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the European Unionplans to discuss additional aid for Chişinău in early March.

The reaction of Russia is interesting. Rather, its stinginess.

On February 28, the propaganda media also published a comment from an “interlocutor” in the Russian Foreign Ministry, who only said that “protecting the interests of the residents of ‘Transnistria’ is one of Russia's priorities” and “all requests are always carefully considered by relevant Russian authorities.”

Another point is that the appeal of the “Congress of Deputies of Transnistria” should be addressed to the Russian parliament. “Should be” — because the declaration of the “congress” mentions only the intention to send such an appeal. As of March 1, it still does not exist.

The fact that Tiraspol did not have time to prepare such a seemingly important address, for which it had to convene a “congress of deputies of all levels” for the first time in almost 18 years, is quite eloquent in itself. Vladimir Putin did not say a word about “Transnistria” in his address to the The name of the Russian parliament, which consists of two chambers, the Federation Council and the State Duma.federal assembly on February 29, which was in fact the announcement of his election program.

The theoretical explanation for Moscow's waiting is quite trivial: it has not given up the idea of bringing all of Moldova under its influence, as Maia Sandu said.

The country will hold presidential elections in the fall of 2024, and parliamentary elections early next year. And there is reason to believe that the pro-European Sandu and her Action and Solidarity party will not win as convincingly as in previous elections. That is why the Kremlin is actively looking for someone who could play on the pro-Russian field as an opposition to the current government.

So this time, another Russian-inspired escalation seems to have been avoided. But this does not mean that Russia has given up its attempts to arrange it.