Everything could have been better, but we weren't prepared. Why power outages continue and how long they will last

Why the electricity situation is so difficult

According to the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, as of the first 10 days of November, the country's electricity generation capacity stood at 12.8 GW. That is the amount of electricity the system produces in one hour.

However, according to energy expert Yuriy Korolchuk’s assessment, the picture of Ukrainian generation may look somewhat worse. There may be only about 10 GW of available capacity, as attacks have damaged almost all thermal and hydroelectric power plants, which typically meet around 35 percent of electricity demand.

"We really need about 13-14 GW, so we have a deficit of up to 4 GW. If we had 15 GW of capacity for winter, there would be no blackouts at all, or they would be minimal," Korolchuk says.

"Currently, the electricity generation deficit is estimated at 2.3-6 GW — depending on the degree of consequences of the aggressor's attacks in a certain period," explains Oleksandr Holizdra, head of the League of Energy Development of Ukraine.

Ukraine can import 2.1 GW of electricity from Europe per hour, and from December, this possibility will increase to 2.3 GW. In October and November, imports were active, but Ukraine does not use the entire permitted import capacity. First, this electricity is sometimes significantly more expensive than Ukrainian. Second, Moldova's needs are "built into" this quota, meaning the European Union can provide 2.3 GW for Ukraine and Moldova together. Additionally, Moldova actively buys electricity from Romania, and this electricity is not always available for sale in Europe. Third, due to damage to lines and substations, Ukrenergo sometimes cannot transmit this electricity across the country, except perhaps to power western Ukraine.

All this became the reason that, already in mid-November, blackouts lasted seven or even eight hours in a row. The longest — in frontline regions, because attacks there are more intense, repairs are slower, and transmitting electricity from nuclear power plants in the west and south of the country is not always possible due to destroyed transmission lines. Hence comes the version that the Russians allegedly want to divide the Ukrainian energy system into right and left banks, gradually turning the left bank into hell.

The situation has improved somewhat now, though it is extremely difficult to call it normal. Four hours in a row without power during working hours is a fairly difficult test for both citizens and businesses. Although back in September, repair work in some places could ensure full restoration of electricity in just a day.

However, the current relative improvement is related to the fact that since the end of November, eight out of nine reactors of three Ukrainian nuclear power plants on government-controlled territory are operating at full capacity. All nine power units have a total nominal capacity of 7.9 GW, making them the foundation of the entire energy system.

The Russians are now targeting high-voltage lines of the state company Ukrenergo, through which it transmits large volumes of electricity between regions. It happens that after one strike, a second one follows in the same place.

"The situation is improving somewhat, the nuclear units are being loaded more. But this is a gradual process, meaning there cannot be a sharp improvement where there are blackouts today, and tomorrow there are no schedules at all. This will be a gradual restoration of each facility," says Daria Orlova, market analyst at ExPro Electricity.

Back in October, energy sector specialists were convinced that having sufficient equipment for repairs would alleviate the electricity situation. Now, it is clear that two serious negative factors are at play simultaneously: generation is low, and numerous repairs are needed, but equipment is not always available for them. All this indicates that for the winter of 2025-2026, Ukraine had no and still has no real energy plan. Energy companies must deal with problems independently, without clear coordination or significant resource assistance from the Ministry of Energy or the central government in general.

"Accordingly, we simply have a situation where we could have been much better prepared, but unfortunately, we are forced to go through another winter with the old baggage. That is, on the old traditional Soviet generation, without having as much distributed generation as the energy system needs," says Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, former head of the state company Ukrenergo.

Two or three precise hits by Russian drones or missiles on a large power plant immediately take 0.5-1.5 GW out of operation, which becomes an extremely painful blow to the energy system. And by attacking two, three, or four power plants, the Russians plunge almost the entire country into darkness.

"The idea proposed back at the beginning of 2023 was decentralization of generation,” Kudrytskyi explains. “That is, the construction of hundreds and even thousands of small power plants in containers, ordinary 40-foot sea containers, which could be distributed across Ukraine's territory and which cannot be turned off with two, three, or even 20 missiles simply because of their number. This is the so-called presidential gigawatt program, announced last year and still not implemented, because in 2024 these tasks were assigned to state companies — Ukrnafta, Ukrzaliznytsia, Naftogaz, Gas Transmission System Operator, the state energy trader ECU. And of that gigawatt, maybe 10-15 percent has been done in total. Therefore, the private sector and private capital must address this. Private capital invests in these new-type power plants, but there are concerns about trust in state regulation. The 'Mindichgate' scandal not only undermines the trust of Western donors; it also undermines the trust of Ukrainian investors in the energy sector."

According to him, in April 2025, the Ministry of Energy blocked a competition for the construction of new distributed generation by its decision, as a result of which 400 MW of capacity that could have been operating in the energy system this winter was not built.

Under such conditions, it is very difficult to talk about the predictability of state energy regulation. For example, in October, the Cabinet of Ministers raised the price of gas for gas installations (from 14,000 hryvnias to 16,000 hryvnias ($332-379) per thousand cubic meters for electricity production; from 18,000 hryvnias to 21,000 hryvnias ($427-498) for the production of both electricity and heat). And already in November, the government announced a reduction in these prices.

According to the League of Energy Development of Ukraine, in 2024, approximately 950 MW of distributed generation was put into operation — this includes solar and wind power plants, mini-CHPs, and cogeneration gas installations that can produce both electricity and heat. In the first half of 2025, an additional 600 MW of decentralized generation capacity was commissioned, and by the end of the year, the Ministry of Energy announced the commissioning of an additional 400 MW.

However, more than 60 percent of these capacities were built for business, industry, and sometimes active territorial communities' own use, which aim to ensure energy independence on their own. This means that such electricity does not enter the national energy grid, and it is unrealistic to cover, for example, dark hours in population schedules with it. Ukrenergo, which issues orders on how much electricity and at what time needs to be transmitted to a specific region or oblast, cannot issue such orders to the same cogeneration gas installations that the business has built for itself.

"Indeed, a company can install a small gas turbine for itself and simply turn it on during external power outages,” explains Olena Lapenko, general manager for security and resilience at DiXi Group. “Such generation remains 'invisible' to the energy system. Often, businesses and households invest more quickly in local solutions (such as rooftop solar, diesel and gas generators, and batteries) due to their own need for uninterrupted power. The state and municipalities are also launching programs, but their speed is limited by budgets, procurement procedures, and the need for integration with the grid, which requires additional permitting stages."

The Kyiv City State Administration purchased seven gas piston installations with a capacity of more than 20 MW each, spending 10.5 billion hryvnias ($249 million) on this — from budget funds, municipal company Kyivteploenergo funds, and UN financing. But it is only now that six of these seven installations are being installed to start operating by the end of the year. One very small 1.5 MW installation started operating in Kyiv at the end of 2024.

As soon as attacks began in 2022, it became clear that Kyiv needed new capacities, but for some reason, they waited three years. This is a rather odd story, especially since Kyiv has the funds to purchase the necessary equipment and opportunities to install it. In fact, even Kharkiv-based enterprises are very actively installing these systems; they operate in municipal enterprises. So it was not a problem for them, but why it became a problem for Kyiv is unknown.Daria Orlova, analyst at ExPro Electricity

In 2023, five mini-CHPs were installed in Kharkiv, and by 2024 there were already 21. That same year, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that an "energy island" is being created in the city to meet electricity needs from local sources in case it is impossible to get enough electricity from the national energy system.

As early as the end of 2022, the U.S. Agency for International Development USAID and other Western donors began providing local communities, including Kyiv, with cogeneration gas installations. However, communities lacked both technical understanding and funds to connect and use these installations.

"There should have been coordination since 2023, when these gas turbines and gas pistons started arriving in different cities,” notes Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, former head of Ukrenergo.

“It was necessary to compile the appropriate registry, distribute who should get them first, and who second. Adopt some unified technical solutions, perhaps. Because today Kyiv is installing these gas systems, spending its own budget funds on them. But we also know that searches are conducted almost weekly in municipal enterprises regarding the targeted use of their funds. The question arises: if some political struggle with the Kyiv authorities continues — how much does this create normal conditions for Kyiv city to spend hundreds of millions of hryvnias now on such connections?"

There were some meetings, some slogans, some conferences, some big gatherings of people, but there is no real, daily, routine work that would ensure coordination in the industry — there was none, and there is none now.Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, former head of Ukrenergo

To finance the necessary work and procurement in the process of restoring the Ukrainian energy system, the Ukraine Energy Support Fund was created back in April 2022. As of April 2025, it had accumulated 1.2 billion euros ($1.4 billion) in financial assistance from international donors. However, since then, almost nothing has been heard about its activity, despite the fact that money for the energy system is extremely needed.

"This fund is underutilized,” says Kudrytskyi. “There is money available, but part of it is lying in accounts and not being utilized because the Ministry of Energy has poorly performed the function of timely accumulation and distribution of this money. The funding problem is huge, and it is not that donors have no money for Ukrainian energy. The problem is whom to give this money to now. There is no institution to do it. Ukrenergo is in default, and opportunities to exit default have not been provided. No one will give even a penny to Energoatom to hold in their hands. The same applies to Centrenergo, as well as to state-owned [regional] oblenergos. There is no trust in the energy sector."

And donors are not always too generous. The European Investment Bank, a large financial institution, since the start of the full-scale war has provided Ukrenergo with 136 million euros ($159 million) for the construction of anti-drone protection. For example, just this summer, the EIB provided Moldova with 143.5 million euros ($168 million) for energy efficiency measures.

For Ukraine now, both energy efficiency and, of course, protection from airstrikes are important. "We are talking about protecting vulnerable elements for power plants, in particular transformers that connect power units where electricity is generated with the energy system. These transformers were mostly built in the Soviet Union and stand in the open air. This is large and expensive equipment," notes former head of Ukrenergo Volodymyr Kudrytskyi.

These transformers, since 202,3 needed to be protected from Shahed [drones] with concrete shelters. Precisely from Shaheds, because the Russians launch 20-30, up to 40 missiles per attack, but they can launch 400-500 Shaheds. These are critical nodes — they needed to be protected, and most of them are currently unprotected. Only in October, under the leadership of Vice Prime Minister [Oleksiy] Kuleba, a coordination headquarters was created that began protecting 100 objects of various oblenergo and power plants. But the question is — what was done for two years before this, why did it start only now?Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, former head of Ukrenergo

In addition to all these problems with electricity, demand for it is growing from industry and business, which consume no less than 65 percent of all electricity in the energy system. For example, defense production is growing very intensively — from $3 billion in 2023 to $9 billion in 2024, and it continues to grow in 2025.

More than 100 industrial parks have also appeared in Ukraine — these are usually production and warehouse complexes that have benefits from the Cabinet of Ministers. They also need electricity.

Skepticism and hopes of the Ukrainian energy sector

Currently, there are hardly any reasons to say that in any foreseeable perspective, electricity will become available 100 percent.

If winter is normal, without any super deviations, super frosts, then likely there will be blackouts 12 on 12. That is, 12 hours with power, 12 without. It is clear that of those 12 when there is power, most likely half will be in the night period. Consider that there will be six hours of electricity in the daytime.Yuriy Korolchuk, energy expert

"We can only say that as a country we have the opportunity to take measures so that the 2026-2027 heating season passes in different conditions for us,” believes Kudrytskyi.

“These measures primarily protect what can be protected from Shaheds. This is mainly transformers at power plants and oblenergos. We must talk about accelerated deployment of distributed generation that will backup these large Soviet-era plants. We must also discuss the expedited restoration of the damaged infrastructure. During this heating season, it is already too late to take any radical measures that can quickly improve the situation. This needed to be done earlier."

Olena Lapenko from DiXi Group advises accelerating energy assistance programs from international partners.

"International aid can be significant, and it is happening (supply of generators, transformers, mobile blocks), but there are limitations: logistics, installation, and restoration of object protection require time,” the expert notes.

“Real measures that can be scaled in a monthly perspective are primarily mobile and modular generators. They are quickly delivered and deployed to power critical districts and facilities. The EU and international funds are already making such supplies, and they need to be ramped up. This provides tangible local relief."