Counting The Casualties After US Airstrike Hits Russian Mercenaries

On February 7, reports emerged that over 200 Russian military contractors were killed or wounded as a result of a US airstrike in Syria. Since then, however, many have called that initial figure into question.

“Reliable social media analysts” have only been able to confirm the deaths of eight or nine Russian mercenaries, according to Michael Weiss, Senior Editor at The Daily Beast. All of them are affiliated with the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization often referred to as Moscow’s answer to Blackwater.

Weiss believes there may be a reason behind the exaggerated claims. “A lot of this emanates from the Russian ultranationalist community…” he told Hromadske. “And my suspicion or my theory as to why there's an exaggerated casualty and fatality rate is these ultranationalists are trying to goad the Kremlin into responding militarily to the United States. In other words, coax Russia into war with America.”

Russian military equipment in Latakia, Syria on May 4, 2016. Photo credit: EPA-EFE/SERGEI CHIRIKOV

However, Weiss does not think that military conflict between the US and Russia is likely.

“I don't think Washington and Moscow are stupid or crazy enough to risk all-out war between the United States and Russia. And, again, this is why they're using mercenaries on the Russian side, because they can say, like they did in Ukraine: "We're not even here, these aren't our guys, we don't employ them," Weiss said.

Hromadske spoke with Michael Weiss over Skype to discuss the recent US airstrike on Russian mercenaries, the situation in Syria, and what this airstrike could mean for US-Russia relations.

My first question is about this American attack in Syria, there are many rumors about it. For example, Bloomberg informs that there were more than two hundred Russians killed in this attack, but they actually have no evidence. Can you please tell us more, what do we know for sure now about this attack?

Well, based on some of the more reliable social media analysts, who cover Russian war dead, be it in Ukraine or Syria, we've confirmed about eight or nine Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner group, which I'm sure Ukrainian viewers of your show are quite familiar with because they have been deployed to Donbas in the last few years. But yeah, I mean, the Bloomberg report – I'm a bit skeptical of, only because the sourcing is one unnamed US official and three "Russians familiar with the matter." Now, we did a deep dive at the Daily Beast about the kind of scuttlebutt that we were hearing of these inflated or exaggerated claims of hundreds, possibly 600 Russian mercenaries, killed in a US airstrike. A lot of this emanates from the Russian ultranationalist community, including and especially Colonel Igor Strelkov, who I absolutely know Ukrainians are familiar with because he was the commander of the "DNR." He's a former Russian intelligence officer. In the past, he has tried to embarrass Putin by suggesting that Russia did not do enough to help Russian fighters in Ukraine. And my suspicion or my theory as to why there's an exaggerated casualty and fatality rate is these ultranationalists are trying to goad the Kremlin into responding militarily to the United States. In other words, coax Russia into war with America. I mean, just based on the history of US engagement in Syria, there's never a willingness to engage pro-regime forces. Whenever these operations have been undertaken, they've been taken in self-defense because pro-regime forces have antagonized American allies, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is a largely Kurdish paramilitary operation, and US special operators in the field. I have never seen a single example where a US air strike, for instance, took out 600 ISIS fighters, so the idea they could have killed 600 Russians, to me, is completely ludicrous. so the real question is how many and will this happen again? And what I'm of the mind to believe is that, look, Putin is relying on mercenaries because they're plausibly deniable and they're expendable. They're illegal under Russian law to use and to send into the field, but the Russian government does this because it would rather send in guns for hire than Russian regular army soldiers. So, you notice the Kremlin's response to this was: "We have no evidence," Peskov says that they need to verify these claims, blah, blah, blah. In other words, Russia is pretending like it didn't happen so that it doesn't have to do anything about it, it doesn't have to retaliate, and that probably means that they will continue to use these kinds of elements, these private military contractors, to, kind of, test the fortifications and the deterring capability of the US zone that is now emerging in one third of Syria. But, I haven't seen any hard evidence to suggest that these hundreds of people have been killed. The Pentagon's first initial reaction was to say that about a hundred pro-Regime forces were taken out, but pro-regime forces aren't just Russian mercenaries, they also include Syrian operators in the field, and we have evidence to show that indeed Syrian fighters were killed in the airstrike. So, I just take some of these crazier claims with a great deal of caution and skepticism because there's no hard proof of any of it yet.

Russian soldiers patrolling the ruins of Palmira in Syria. Photo credit: EPA/SERGEI CHIRIKOV​

Could you please tell us more about how American forces coordinate and cooperate with the Russians in Syria, because we can more or less say that they are on the same side of the war.

Yes and no. I mean, they don't cooperate, they do coordinate in what's known as a deconfliction, kind of, protocol. In other words, they let the Russians know when they're coming near Russian patrolled airspace, or Russian groundspace, and they basically say: "Stay out of our way." Now, in this instance, there has been some reporting in the Washington Post by David Ignatius, who's in Syria now, or he was when he filed this piece, suggesting that the Syrian Democratic Forces, these Kurdish American proxies alerting the Russians to what they were doing and were ignored by Russia. And the Americans also alerted the Russians to what was happening – similarly ignored. And, instead, this pro-regime contingent, which includes, as I say, the Wagner group, pressed ahead and started to attack SDF positions, and these SDF positions include US special forces embedded with the Kurds, so American had no choice but to retaliate in order to defend its guys on the ground. But, to say that they are on the same side – look, it's true that America has prioritized in the last few years since it went to war with ISIS, fighting only Sunni jihadists and making a point, bending over backwards, to reassure the Assad regime, the Iranians and the Russians: "We have no quarrel with you, our mission is very limited as a counterterrorism one. But now things are changing. Secretary of state Rex Tillerson has outlined the contours of a Syria policy, if not the actual meat of a Syria policy, and has made it clear that, look, America is staying in Syria, it is going to occupy – lightly occupy, not like Iraq, but with a few thousand troops and relying heavily on the Syrian Democratic Forces as its ground army – about a third of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates river, which is the borderland that Syria shares with Iraq. Now, the goal for this is to ensure doesn't reconstitute itself as a caliphate and is kept down, but also – and I think even primarily – to keep the regime, the Iranians and the Russians out of that area; to deprive this access of resistance, plus Moscow, from essentially taking over all of the Levante. Iran wants to establish a land bridge between Tehran and the Mediterranean coast. This will disrupt that ambition. So the American objective in Syria is now shifting away from strict counter-terrorism to – as the Pentagon outlined in its defense strategy – a great power conflict and geopolitical struggle, containment, in a word, containment of America's regional and global adversaries in the region. So I say that there is a coming confrontation with Russia. I mean, what you're seeing now is essentially spheres of influence being carved out and both sides will engage in these light and easily de-escalated skirmishes. Now, the risk that this poses, of course, is that, well, what happens if these light and easily de-escalated skirmishes turn into something bigger – a more consistent confrontation and something that cannot be so easily deescalated. But, look, I don't think Washington and Moscow are stupid or crazy enough to risk all-out war between the United States and Russia. And, again, this is why they're using mercenaries on the Russian side, because they can say, like they did in Ukraine: "We're not even here, these aren't our guys, we don't employ them," even though Wagner and other groups are indeed under the command of the Russian Defense Ministry, and are paid by the Russian government, and are now, according to reporting done in the Russia press, being offered a stake in Syria's oil and gas sector as a reward for their adventurism abroad.

US's F-22 Raptors over Syria.​​ Photo credit: Staff Sgt. Colton Elliott/Air National Guard​

We know about at least eight or nine Wagner fighters in Syria, and still, it's the first time when Russians have been killed by Americans in Syria. What is important about this? You mentioned the possible consequences, what could Moscow's answer be in Syria? Is it a really serious situation?

Well, I mean, they have two choices and it's clear which one they've opted for. Choice number one: America has killed Russian contract soldiers in Syria. Doing that, though, would put a lot of pressure on Putin to respond or retaliate in some fashion, whether rhetorically or militarily. Doesn't want to do that. That's option two. Option two is: we have no evidence that any of our people have been killed by the Americans, but, they'll carry on with the disinformation propaganda campaign – America is there to steal Syrian Arab land and America is supporting ISIS and blah, blah, blah. So more of the same. But again, it shows that Putin cannot go too far in antagonizing the United States because he knows he's up against a superior adversary, he knows that, I mean, look, American will defend itself. If Russian regular soldiers, or if Russian air force, try to attack US military positions in Syria, they would be shot back at, they would be counter-attacked, and that could not be done in plausibly deniable fashion. So again, I see some gray zones, some ambiguity, in what Russia is trying to do. And again, why does Russia want this area that America is still going to be indefinitely occupying? The answer to that is: Syria's economy is rebounding after several years of attritional warfare, but Putin does not want to be a permanent patron of Bashar al-Assad, he doesn't want to have to continue to give Syria loans that don't get repaid, or send free shipments of oil and so on, he wants Syria to be self-sustaining and he wants the Syrian reconstruction economy to be very much like the Russian economy – floated on corruption and racketeering, and sort Mafia tactics. Now, in order to do that, you need to take back the energy industry, you need to take oil and gas fields, and the most significant oil fields in Syria are in Hasakah province, in the northeast, which is part of this new American protectorate. So, here again, America is actually undercutting Russian – and behind them Iranian and Syrian – ambitions for essentially recapturing the entire country. That's now been foreclosed as a possibility. Assad will never rule so long as American troops are in 30% or 33% of the country.

 /Interview by Ostap Yarysh

/Text by Sofia Fedeczko