Сommander of 68th Brigade on Pokrovsk's fate, role of drones in war, and problematics of truce for the sake of truce

Serhiy Tretyak joined the 68th Separate Oleksa Dovbush Jaeger Brigade in the hot summer of 2024: Ukrainian troops were rapidly retreating in the Pokrovsk sector, and the offensive was not being stopped. He had to receive the soldiers exhausted after heavy fighting in Semenivka. By the end of 2024, the situation remained extremely difficult as the Russians gradually approached Pokrovsk.
But despite the apocalyptic predictions, Pokrovsk is holding on. According to the commander, the Russians have now shifted their main attacks towards Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Access to the road from Pavlohrad to Pokrovsk would allow them to cut off the logistics of the Ukrainian grouping.
Learn more about the hottest sector, the future of Pokrovsk, and problems in the Ukrainian army in an interview with the commander of the 68th Brigade, Serhiy Tretyak.
"The situation has become much easier than it was in winter"
hromadske: We were in Pokrovsk in December 2024, and at the time, to be honest, I thought that this might be my last report from there. Many people said that Pokrovsk would not last until the end of the year or would be lost within a few months. And yet, Pokrovsk is still standing, even though it is very destroyed. How do we manage to hold Pokrovsk?
Serhiy Tretyak: The enemy has already announced six or seven times the dates when it will take Pokrovsk. If I'm not mistaken, the first date was by the end of October 2024, then by the end of the year, and by Easter. A great deal of work has been done by all the teams working on this front. It's not that Pokrovsk is standing, for example, because of drones, artillery or infantry. We are talking about the whole range of work that has been done and is holding back the enemy. Plus, most importantly, we are inflicting such losses on it in terms of personnel that it simply does not have time to replenish them. The enemy is running out of breath.
Has coordination between units improved?
There are brigades that have been here for a long time. Accordingly, we call the neighboring brigade commanders: "Hello, what's up? Is everything okay?". We have quite a serious interaction with regard to fire engagement. And thanks to the fact that we help each other, it is happening.
Do you have a situation where you don't know what is happening on the flanks?
No, we know everything. To the left, to the right of us - four brigades to the left and four to the right - where they are going, how many enemy soldiers are running, where they are running.
We can say that the situation in the Pokrovsk sector has stabilized. Or would that be an exaggeration?
I will say that it has become much easier than it was, for example, in the winter. The enemy is still hoping to take this city. It is also trying to reach the border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The situation will be fully stabilized when the enemy stops advancing at all, we create the conditions, and start advancing.
But we are, in fact, counterattacking here.
Yes, there are moments when we create conditions in certain areas to counterattack and occupy a certain area. But it's all very pointed, selective.
Do you think that these attempts by the Russians to take the road to Pavlohrad are more of a political task to gain a foothold on the borders of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast or a tactical one to cut off our logistics?
I think it is a purely political task. It is 90 percent political.
So that they can later say that they claim Dnipropetrovsk Oblast?
Perhaps they will say that, or perhaps they will say that their task was to reach the border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. "That's it, we're ending the ‘special military operation’ and calling it Operation Desert Storm 2," figuratively. They need to show that they took the territories they wanted. I think it is most likely to raise their approval in the eyes of their population.
But essentially, the Russians have fire control over a section of the highway, right?
No, they don't. The problem is somewhat at the very entrance to Pokrovsk, where FPV drones can reach. Artillery cannot reach there. It's not that they have control.
Did [Ground Forces commander] General [Mykhailo] Drapatyi play any role in stabilizing the Pokrovsk sector?
I can say that every person present in this area played an important role, including the commander of the Ground Forces.
"Approximately 80% of [enemy] personnel are killed by drones"
What tactics do the Russians most often use here? How are they currently fighting in the Pokrovsk sector?
Over the past three months, they have tried so many tactics. They stormed us with armored vehicles, stormed us with armored vehicles and on foot at the same time. Then they started running out of armored vehicles, and they started attacking us in Ladas, UAZs, buggies and on foot.
Then they began to attack on foot in large groups. Later, they realized that the losses were too great, and began to storm us on foot in small groups of two or three people. Now they are attacking in small groups of two to eight people on foot, plus motorcycles.
What is the ratio of forces here?
Each brigade has a different number of units that storm them. Some are stormed by a regiment, others by two brigades and two regiments. Two months ago, two brigades and two regiments were attacking me. Now we are being stormed by one brigade and one regiment. They moved a little bit to another sector - Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
What is the situation with your artillery? Do you have enough shells now?
We would like to have more, of course, but we are fulfilling the task with the amount we are given.
Have our geopolitical problems with the United States had any impact on the number of weapons?
Maybe because we have a difficult sector, we have been given the same amount as before. Perhaps in some other sector, where the situation is a little easier, supplies have been cut.
If we compare artillery and drones, what is the number of hits caused by drones?
If we look at the percentage, I think about 80% of the Russian personnel who die are killed by drones. Maybe even 85%. Because we usually use artillery when there is a concentration of personnel. And now they are storming two or three soldiers at a time. It's a waste to use a lot of shells on that.
How many drones do you currently receive from the government?
Not enough, let's just say. Most of the drones are covered by volunteer help.
Can drones win the war?
No, never. Drones are one of the elements that will ensure victory. But never with drones alone.
[Hero of Ukraine] Kyrylo Veres said that 2025 will be the year of fiber optics. To what extent do fiber-optic drones change the situation on the frontline?
We are already using fiber-optic drones. Such a drone can fly into a basement and fly around it looking for a target.
A radio-controlled drone immediately loses control and the picture. We have had cases where they flew in bad weather, such as very dense fog. It still flies slowly, and the picture is normal. It's a good thing, but it's still not a panacea.
But it is a very big danger.
Yes, this is evolving and they are not affected by electronic warfare. There are several methods we use to counter them. If Pokrovsk is in our brigade's lane behind us and the enemy flies on fiber optics directly to the city to hit a target there, we already know the approximate routes they fly. People with smooth-bore weapons sit on these routes and simply shoot them down.
Don't you feel that the Russians are transferring units from Kursk Oblast?
I don't think so far.
What do you think the future of Pokrovsk will look like?
I think the enemy will pressure it for a very long time. We will do everything to prevent them from entering the city, but the KAB guided aerial bombs will destroy most of it.
"Infantry needs to raise its popularity"
How many people do you recruit through recruitment now? And what part of them joins through mobilization?
Most of the recruits come through recruitment to the company of unmanned aerial vehicles, which is transferred to the battalion. No one goes to the units that are on the front line, the infantry, who do the dirty work, through recruitment. Because if we told a person that he will be a pilot, he will be a pilot, if we said he will be a driver, he will be a driver.
The situation with mobilization is a bit different. People are brought in and selected on the basis of their professional aptitude. Few people come to us, because when they hear that this is the 68th Brigade, which is stationed in Pokrovsk, where it is difficult, they do not go there. "We would rather go somewhere to protect Volyn, Kyiv Oblast." Because the sector is difficult and it is hard to recruit and motivate people. Even drivers and pilots are hard to find, because the sector is difficult.
Plus, now there is a company of unmanned regiments, and they interrupt our recruitment process. Because they have gained a lot of popularity, and people want to join them.
Do people want to join the drone regiment?
Yes, mostly. No one wants to do the dirty work.
And what to do about it? War is impossible without infantry.
The question is whether drones will win the war. No. But will infantry win the war - yes. We can get out of the situation with a small number, but with experience. Right now, they have made something terrible out of the infantry. Instead of raising the popularity of the infantry, it is usually put down. The infantry needs to raise its popularity.
I think that most commanders get mobilized people who are no longer very motivated to fight. How do you work with this if a person comes in who doesn't want to go to the contact line, for example?
We need to understand a very important thing: a soldier who is brought through the Territorial Recruitment Center is an average Ukrainian. I can't say that this is a bad or a good soldier, because I don't like it when a number of commanders say: "I was given bad soldiers, and the other commander was given good soldiers." No. Because this is a cross-section of society, an average Ukrainian. And they are all the same. It's just a matter of motivation.
First, motivation, even if a person doesn't want to, eventually appears. When a person finds himself in a team of ten people digging, he thinks: "Well, shit, everyone is digging. I'll start digging too." And he starts digging too.
Secondly, it is very important that there is a period of adaptation: when a person joins a brigade, he or she does not go straight from the bus and into the trench. This is not the case now. During the adaptation period, he has to see that there are a number of people - the pilots, FPV guys, scouts, collective weapons, machine gunners, grenade launchers, artillery - and that all of them cover him. He has to see that the connection is constantly established with the position. He knows that if he says to the radio station: "I've run out of water," a Vampire drone will fly in the evening and throw him two or three bottles of water. If he sees this, then it will somehow work out.
And when there are cases - we won't name the units - but there are cases when they just put people in a vehicle, brought them, dropped them off at a plantation and drove away. The soldier does not understand which side the enemy is on, who his neighbor is, how to communicate with the commander, or perhaps they were not given a radio. I didn't have this experience, but I know about such cases from my friends. For me, this is wild, and I am constantly working with commanders on this issue.
"Infantry is the wall between the dead and the living. It's hard, but it's honorable." You said this in an interview. You started with the infantry and have seen the war since 2014. How has the war changed since then?
I started the war in 2014 as a platoon commander. I was 22 years old, I had contract soldiers only. The average age of a contract soldier was 19. So you can start with that. The fighting was different then.
... Neither we nor they had war experience then. It's hard to compare, but as a result of those battles, we are now where we are, not somewhere in Vinnytsia Oblast defending ourselves. That experience still led to something good.
Battalion commanders and brigade commanders are mostly people who were company and platoon commanders at the time and have experience of being there.
People say that there was no war in 2018. Whether there was or wasn't, people were still dying. This is the worst thing: we have moved to a stabilization operation: we are in the trenches, the enemy is in the trenches, no one is moving, the front is standing, and people are dying.
Can this happen again?
Yes, it can. But it will be a political decision.
"If there is a truce for the sake of a truce, it will not lead to anything good"
The transition to the corps-based system will be difficult and long. What do you think about the transition to the corps-based system?
I think it's a good thing. It's just that this particular transition will be difficult and long. The teams that are now being formed in the corps will be a little different in six months or eight months. Because they will begin to get used to each other, commanders will see the capabilities of some heads of military and service areas, and they will realize that someone does not work in their style of work and is not suitable, and they will begin to change them. The process of forming good and strong management will take eight months or six months.
This will be much better than what we have, because it will be a command center that will be able to provide support to the brigade, influence personnel policy in the brigade, and it will be much easier for the commander to manage his own units than someone else's. I don't really like it when some unit is assigned to me. First of all, my people already know my style of work. Someone comes along who doesn't work in my style, but I can't change them. I can't influence it, because the person is not mine, but someone else likes them. And you want to work with the team that you have formed yourself, and if someone doesn't suit you, you can change them and put someone who suits you. And here it turns out that you can't do anything.
Finally, I want to ask you what the military thinks about the truce. What are they waiting for now?
The worst thing for me is that the ceasefire could turn into a period similar to the one we had in 2016, when the war turned into a stabilization operation. Our soldiers will just sit in the trenches, the enemy will sit in the trenches, and from time to time someone will kill someone, and it will not be resolved.
It will drag on for who knows how many years. A ceasefire must be one of the elements of the end of the war in order for political processes to begin. Because if there is a truce for the sake of a truce, it will not lead to anything good.
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