Will Bakhmut stand? Interview with a researcher of Institute for the Study of War

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the American analytical center of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has been publishing daily reports on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war. ISW's analysis has become an important source of information for journalists and politicians, as well as a record of history.

The Institute is also actively monitoring the situation around Bakhmut. hromadske spoke with Kateryna Stepanenko, a Ukrainian Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, who lives in Washington, D.C., about what is coming next in the Bakhmut sector, where Russia might strike next, and what Ukraine needs to do to get Crimea back.

“Putin tries to distance himself from Prigozhin”

I would like to start with the recent developments in Bakhmut. The Russian forces launched an offensive in the Donetsk region and managed to capture Soledar. Why did they succeed after six months of failures?

It all boiled down to the Wagner group putting a lot of their prisoners to fight in an effort to get to Bakhmut. They realized when the attack was culminating that it was not working out, and in an effort to capture Soledar they actually had to commit some of their elite forces. So we're talking about committing elite Wagner forces that have operated in previous operations all over the world to get to the settlement. It shows you their lack of their ability to get any sort of large-scale advances in Ukraine at this point.

What do you think about Evgeny Prigozhin is a founder of the Private Military Company WagnerPrigozhin’s future? Will this offensive bring him any benefits when it comes to his position in Kremlin?

I think he definitely wanted to use the victory over Soledar as a bargaining tool. This is kind of just my own suspicion that it almost seems like he knew about the changes within the Russian forces, namely the reappointment of general Gerasimov for the position of the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. And on the eve of that, he has pushed for the capture of Soledar to prove that he's a great leader, that he can achieve something and try to prove himself, but it looks like it's backfiring on him.

It looks like Putin's rhetoric has been very distanced from him. Putin goes on this television and he says that only Russian forces, the Russian General Staff, and the Russian MoD were the successful planners of the operation in Soledar.

We also have Putin meeting with Prigozhin’s mortal enemy Alexander Beglov, who is the St. Petersburg governor, and they interestingly talk about how Beglov has contributed to the war effort, which is something that Prigozhin has historically criticized him. We also have the reappointment of Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground ForcesLapin.

And we have this kind of back and forth in the information space where Putin's spokespersonPeskov also had responded to rumors about the conflict between Kremlin and Prigozhin. No, he said, there's no conflict, however, there are some people that are within Russia that are worse than our own enemies.

In that sense, it looks like Prigozhin imagined this to be the victory that would establish him and give him the power to negotiate with higher-ups, with Putin about his own position and the legality of his group. But ultimately, it's becoming more of a conflict within the information space and between Prigozhin and the traditional Russian institutions like the Russian Ministry of Defense at this point, where he has to constantly try to prove that he’s still operating in the area, and has to over-exaggerate his claims.

And we're going to continue to see how he tries to employ his leverage in the information space in an effort to benefit his political position in Russia.

Do we understand why Putin tries to distance himself from Prigozhin?

He needs to do so in an effort to push the military reforms that he's trying to institute. As we've seen, Russia is trying to expand its military. They have announced several measures that would expand the military: forming new divisions, reforming old ones. And in order for him to do that he really needs to seize control of both the information space, but also to reestablish his own institution, the Russian Ministry of Defense, as the authoritative source of information and power that is going to continue this war. Prigozhin doesn't really fit into that narrative, given that we've seen that the Kremlin is not interested in publicly recognizing their affiliation with Wagner.

What's coming next in Bakhmut? Is ISW still sure that the Russians won't be able to capture the city?

Yes, we still follow that assessment. The capture of Soledar is very tactical, it's a very small village of 14 square kilometers. It does not lead Russian forces to the main ground lines of communication like logistics routes that span from like the Chasiv Yar area to Bakhmut. And effectively, it's not a significant loss, that is going to, as Russia says it, “encircle Bakhmut.”

That's not necessarily what's happening on the ground. And given the scale of Ukrainian defense in Bakhmut and the recent decreased scale of attacks after the capture of Soledar, it's safe to say that Bakhmut will be standing. And our assessment still stands that Soledar was not the breakthrough victory that Russian propaganda has portrayed it to be.

“It is very possible that Ukraine can get to Crimea and liberate all of its occupied territories”

Does the ISW have any idea what Ukraine’s counter-offensive may look like? Where Ukraine might strike next?

As a matter of our policy, we don't really forecast Ukrainian movements but I can talk to you about some areas where we're not seeing potential Russian offensive operations. We know that Russians are heavily fortifying Kherson, Zaporizhzhia oblasts as well as Crimea, which are all indicators of them being worried about a potential Ukrainian counter-offensive in the areas.

The Russians have repeatedly stated that they are fortifying the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson because they're afraid that Ukrainians will conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations or that they will cross the river and push Russian forces down. And then in Zaporizhzhia oblast for months upon months, we have been seeing a lot of panic with the Russian military blogger community, voenkory, who are basically saying that Ukrainians are preparing for some sort of an attack in Zaporizhzhia oblast. We have not seen anything on the ground nor we'll be able to talk about that.

However, the panic is noteworthy, they know that this is an area that they're worried about. And if Ukrainians were to launch something, it does make sense for Zaporizhzhia to be a battleground. Zaporizhzhia Oblast has one of the most crucial spans of ground lines of communication, which are the logistics routes from Russia to southern Ukraine. If that ground line of communication is cut off, then effectively Russia is left with only the Crimean bridge to cross and that is a significant issue.

Is the new weapons package game-changing for Ukraine? Some reporters said that the West actually is preparing Ukraine for this big offensive. Would you agree with them?

I think it's a very, very good thing that the West and the USA are sending mechanized equipment, for example, like the infantry fighting vehiclesBradleys and Strykers, and we hope that it's a foreshadowing for the West to send Ukraine more tanks. Maneuver warfare is going to be very important in certain segments of the frontline.

I want also to mention that there're other weapons that the West could provide to Ukraine that would be also very influential. New York Times reported there are some discussions about the Biden administration being interested in sending some long-range weapons to Ukraine, that would allow Ukrainians to strike Russian military infrastructure in Crimea.

AND that would be a game changer for Ukrainians, given that a strike on Crimea is fully justified under international law, given that it is Ukrainian territory occupied by Russians. But that would absolutely be crucial in undermining Russian logistics that are deeply rooted in Crimea, that they have been developing for eight years, but also will have the same effect that HIMARS had over the summer when Ukrainians used it in an effort to stop Russian operations on the right bank of Dnipro River.

Can Ukraine win the war and recapture Crimea without long-range missiles? 

It's a hard question. Given that Ukraine has the initiative right now with consistent Western support, it is very possible that Ukraine can get to Crimea and liberate all of its occupied territories.

“There's a low likelihood of Russian resuming attacks from Belarus”

Will the Russians try to mobilize more troops? Is a two-million army that the Ukrainian intelligence reported a realistic scenario?

I think that they will definitely try to mobilize more men in preparation for a protracted war.

Whether it's just a regular second wave of mobilization or covert mobilization, they still have an objective of increasing their army to at least 1.5 million servicemen from 1.35 million. They've been signaling a lot of mobilization-related changes and orders. Duma officials saying that we should increase the conscription age, Putin signing an order that allows some prisoners to be mobilized back in November. So all of these aspects show that they do need forces.

But the quality of these forces is still very poor, these guys are barely getting in the training. They're also not a lot of provisions within Russia that could accommodate these forces. Hence, we see a lot of Russian mobilized men trained in Belarus because they don't have trainers back home.

Are there any signs, proof, or evidence that could help us to understand where the Russians will strike next? What are they actually preparing for?

There's a lot of talk about Belarus in all of these different scenarios. However, ISW has assessed that we think that the most likely scenario is that Russia will either conduct an offensive operation to regain lost territories in Luhansk- Kharkiv area, the way they moving up from Svatove to the north-west, or that they will double down on the defensive operations meaning that they will try to stop a Ukrainian counter-attack, for example, in the Svatove-Kreminna area.

And we have been seeing Russians move their conventional forces like the VDV- guys to the frontlines in Svatove- Kreminna, and we also have seen them transfer a lot of equipment, from deliveries from Belarus to all over Russia to the Luhansk direction. So the most likely scenario is that they will try to attack from the Luhansk oblast or double down on their defensive operations so that Ukrainians do not conduct a counteroffensive further.

We obviously see a lot of messaging about Belarus right now in the information space. And ISW still assesses that there's a low likelihood of Russian resuming attacks from Belarus. And the reason for that still stands that they don't have enough forces to complete this maneuver. This will take some time to prepare. But if they were to do such an attack, which still remains unlikely, it would be somewhere around fall, because of the Zapad 2023 training that the Ukrainian intelligence has stated that they It was supposed to be in Central Russia and now they moved it again to Zapad, which is Belarus, and the Russia Western military districtmoved to. So effectively, we still don't think that it's likely that they will repeat the attack from Belarus.

Do we understand what Putin’s end goal in Ukraine is? Basically, what does he want?

Yes, his goal has never changed. He has always stated the same maximalist idea that he needs to seize all of Ukraine which means the capitulation of the Ukrainian government and also the full destruction of the Ukrainian military so Ukraine’s ability to fight back.

He has not set back from this goal. His efforts to reconstitute his army, to generate more forces, his strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure - all symbolize that he has not given up his idea of pursuing this goal and there is no talk for negotiation. He has not set any serious conditions that would show Ukraine that there is any potential for negotiation and peace talks.

I guess capturing Luhansk and Donetsk regions won’t be enough for them. They will keep moving forward.

Yes, Gerasimov called the Luhansk and Donestk region the next step however the ultimate goal of ‘special military operation’ still continues to be the ‘denazification’ which is the capitulation of the Ukrainian government and the full capture of Ukraine unfortunately.