Fedorov confirms he is stepping down as defense minister, lists achievements and failures

“It was a great honor to serve the Ukrainian people,” he wrote.

According to Fedorov, his team succeeded in:

• cutting off Russian access to Starlink, which he said sharply reduced Russia’s ability to wage effective drone warfare;
• taking over the Defense Ministry without a budget, then redirecting money from year-end personnel funding into what he described as effective investments in mid-strike systems, fiber-optic FPV drones, low-cost reconnaissance, unmanned ground vehicles, interceptor drones and deep-strike drones;
• buying more drones in four months than had been bought during the entire previous year;
• launching a separate, specially funded “Logistics Lockdown” program that, together with better procurement and support for top units, helped cut Russian logistics and begin the isolation of Crimea;
• continuing the Drone Line funding program, which he called the foundation for supplying drones to the Unmanned Systems Forces;
• launching a support program for modern drone-assault units that fight primarily with technology;
• introducing 70% prepayment for procurement through ePoints on the Brave1 Market portal;
• radically changing the procurement system, including the first tenders for long-range artillery and hundreds of thousands of drones, which he said saved the state budget billions of dollars;
• purchasing thousands of pickups, buggies and ATVs for the military through tenders for the first time;
• integrating Pavlo Lazar into the Air Force and introducing after-action reviews for every mass attack, which he said helped raise the drone interception rate from 83% to 91% and the cruise missile interception rate from 47% to 87%;
• contracting for Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for the first time and applying through a European credit program to buy PAC-3 missiles;
• launching a basic level of drone supply for brigades and corps so that, beginning in July, all combat brigades and corps would receive predictable drone deliveries without manual intervention;
• starting a large grant program for explosives and missile manufacturers;
• beginning what he called an unpopular but critical military transformation, including contracts for everyone with defined service terms and deferments, some of the world’s highest pay for infantry and assault troops, opening the market to foreign recruitment on transparent terms, and creating tools to encourage the return of troops who had left their units without authorization;
• holding three Ramstein-format meetings that reportedly helped break what he called a Russian information trap about Ukraine’s defeat and restored partners’ confidence, with $40 billion in support announced for this year, excluding the European loan;
• launching the mechanism for using the European loan for Ukraine’s war priorities;
• finding a way to scale up low-cost missiles against jet-powered Shahed drones and signing what he called a record contract;
• successfully testing a ballistic system developed under the Defense Ministry’s area of responsibility, changing the technical requirements, improving its accuracy and reducing its price by 30%;
• signing a contract to procure Gripen aircraft, which he said would help shoot down Russian Su aircraft that carry guided bombs;
• planning and carrying out, together with the military, Operation Ashan, which he said stopped a Russian mechanized offensive for six months;
• opening exports under the Drone Deal program to attract investment and expand defense production;
• launching Trophy Lab to allow partners to study Russian military technology;
• launching the Defense AI Center A1 to speed up the use of artificial intelligence in warfare.

At the same time, Fedorov said his team failed to:

• complete the organizational transformation of the Defense Ministry according to NATO standards and “common sense,” saying more people who slowed reforms should have been removed more decisively;
• move all procurement to a tender-based system;
• build a culture of accountability for decisions.

“I will continue to work for the mission with which I earlier came to the Defense Ministry — to defeat the enemy through asymmetry, the speed of innovation and the strength of organization. More to come,” Fedorov wrote.

Fedorov’s dismissal

On July 14, Ukraine’s parliament approved the resignation of Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko. Under Ukrainian law, the entire Cabinet automatically resigned with her.

Speculation about replacing the defense minister began immediately. MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak said Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko was being considered for the post, though no final decision had been made.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had said he had not yet decided whether Fedorov would be reappointed in the new government and that he would make up his mind after meeting with Fedorov, prime minister candidate Sergii Koretskyi and military commanders.

On the evening of July 15, however, Zelenskyy told lawmakers from the Servant of the People faction that he would propose Klymenko as defense minister to replace Fedorov.

According to Ukrainska Pravda, Zelenskyy told lawmakers that Fedorov had a systemic conflict with Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, and with the military, and that the issue had not been resolved.

“He [the president] said that ideally he should fire both Fedorov and Syrskyi, but he cannot do that right now,” one source told the outlet.

Sources told the news agency that Fedorov would remain on the president’s team, but that more about his future role would likely become clear next week.

RBC-Ukraine, citing sources, also reported that Zelenskyy was dismissing Fedorov because he and Syrskyi had “different visions of the war.”

“Second, the president said Fedorov and the ministry were making procurement decisions at their own discretion, rather than the way the General Staff and the military had requested. That applied, for example, to the purchase of artillery shells,” one source said.