Analyzing reserve recruitment realities: expert on challenges and opportunities for building Ukraine's mobilization

Last year, most Ukrainians hoped for a quick end to the war. However, it continues, and this year Ukraine has faced the problem of mobilization, which was also voiced out loud by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhny.i

hromadske talked to a military observer and retired colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi about the motivation of Ukrainians to participate in combat operations, the shortcomings of the national mobilization system, and ways to form an effective mobilization reserve.

We are infantile

hromadske: There has been so much destruction, death and grief in Ukraine, and many citizens are still not motivated to join the Armed Forces. What can motivate them? The destruction of their own home?

Serhiy Hrabskyi: For some reason, people hope that the horrors of war will not affect them. And if they do not join the army, the war will not bring them anything bad. They think that the war exists only for those who have stepped up. This is how a certain infantilization of our society manifests itself.

I have the impression that there are two categories of people left outside the army who are fit for service by age and health. The former say that when the draft summons comes, they will go. The second category is those who will ignore a hundred summonses.

You have the wrong impression. There are also people who were simply told to wait because they do not have a military specialty, or their specialty is not relevant at the moment.

I wouldn't say that people who are waiting for a call-up are not motivated. They will go when they are called. They know that they will not hide if they are mobilized. Not every person is ready to volunteer, because it is scary to die and be wounded.

A limited mobilization resource is not a lack of men of a certain age. The limited capacity of our society to defend the country is primarily about low motivation.

An unmotivated society in the tenth year of war?

This is the negative result of processes that have been going on for a long time. Back in 1991, Ukraine decided that it was not in danger. Under the slogans of reforming the army, its personnel was reduced and its property was sold off.

Who would want to connect their lives with the army in such circumstances? There was almost no competition for military schools; everyone was accepted for any specialty.

Later, there was talk of switching to contract service. This would relieve millions of men of responsibility for the country's defense, because, allegedly, contract soldiers would take on all the responsibility.

That is, with such a neighbor and unprotected borders, we were not prepared for Russia's aggression. We did not create a powerful mobilization reserve that could have become the basis for a contract army, and now we are dealing with the consequences.

A mobilization reserve, like in Israel or Switzerland?

In Israel, a person becomes a reservist after completing the so-called conscript service. There, a person learns to be a defender from childhood, because s/he knows that under any circumstances s/he has to serve as a driver, medic, signaller, etc.

And most of us have been determined not to serve since childhood. There was no public demand for the development of the army. For every decision on the army that was not made in time, we now have to pay with human lives.

In Switzerland, every man knows which military reserve he belongs to, what he should do if necessary, and he knows how to do it. After all, they regularly undergo training to hone their skills in a particular military specialty.

Instead, here, you stop a person on the street and ask them: the enemy is coming, what are you going to do? And the person doesn't know, even if he really wants to do something. He doesn't know how to handle a weapon, he doesn't know where to run, who to obey, or who to command. He doesn't know how to work with communication equipment. He does not know how to provide first aid. All these "I don't know" make our mobilization resource limited.

Unlike the Swiss, Ukrainians who have received military specialties at military departments do not have any further opportunities to improve their qualifications in this particular specialty. When it comes to mobilization, they often have to start learning from scratch in a different specialty.

For example, a friend of mine was trained as a cryptologic linguist back in the ‘80s. He came to the military enlistment office voluntarily. He was sent back because they didn't need any cryptologic linguists. Then he was offered to become a signaller. In the end, he is now being trained as an infantry commander with zero experience. No one thought to build on his qualifications as a cryptologic linguist.

Abandon the territorial principle of mobilization

General Zaluzhnyi noted in his column that the mobilization resource is also decreasing due to gaps in our legislation that breed draft dodgers. Do you agree with this?

It's hard to disagree. For example, according to the law, men under 25 who have not served in the army can only volunteer to join the army. And there is no actual conscription in times of war. So they live quietly because they know that their actual dodging is protected by law.

We don't mobilize students, so 40-year-old gentlemen enroll en masse. Men fictitiously marry mothers with many children or mothers of disabled children, because this way they will not be subject to mobilization.

And how many problems we have with medical conditions that can prevent you from joining the army! In Israel, if you cannot join the army for health reasons, you have to do alternative service, and you have known about this since childhood and are preparing for it. But in Ukraine, there’s no need?

Again, I emphasize that this is because, due to the lack of public motivation, Ukraine did not pay much attention to the legislation related to military service.

And we are still making ironic remarks about the Russian mobilization system.

Ours has the same drawbacks as the Russian one, because it is based on the same Soviet principle: to gather a certain number of people from a certain territory without determining their professional readiness.

Our army is organized on a territorial basis. For example, a resident of Zhytomyr who wants to serve is assigned to an air assault brigade based in Zhytomyr. A Poltava resident is assigned to a tank brigade, for example.

"Serving at home" is very convenient for residents of the respective regions. But this convenience has turned into the fact that it is difficult to recruit artillerymen in the "airborne" region, and signallers in the "tank" region. In a war, this creates problems.

At the same time, an advanced army is formed on an extraterritorial basis. But this requires a special registry: what kind of specialists the army needs, where they can learn the relevant profession.

By the way, the territorial principle of forming units, when a person serves in his or her own region, has another drawback: other regions seem alien to them, like why should we go from Frankivsk to serve in Kharkiv Oblast, let Kharkiv residents worry about that; when the Russians come to Frankivsk, then I will defend it.

Let me clarify: the Swiss army, which is considered to be very effective, is also formed on a territorial basis. Or is it different there?

It is formed on a militia basis, which is different. This is when the formation is carried out on a territorial basis. For example, residents of one neighborhood make up a platoon, residents of one village make up a company. For a small country that has forgotten the last time it fought, this is acceptable.

What can be changed now?

Okay, let's get back to the main point. How does one create a mobilization reserve?

Teach people to own weapons, communications equipment, etc. from school. To create conditions for continuous retraining of the reserve. To ensure that people join the army knowing about modern means of warfare. Otherwise, a person is an empty space for the army, not a mobilization resource that can easily adapt to the front.

Any commander will tell you that he would rather take a mobilized man of 45-50 years old than a 20-year-old volunteer. Because a 50-year-old tractor driver can be trained to become a tank driver, for example, faster than a very motivated guy who has not served in the military.

Until Ukrainian schools start teaching boys and girls about military affairs in a quality manner, we may lose the war. We are running out of time. What do you think can be done right now?

Personally, I see several possibilities. From the beginning of the full-scale invasion, each community has the right to create a VTCF, a volunteer territorial community formation, which is essentially a paramilitary unit. The initiative of five community members is enough for this.

Why shouldn't these VTCFs now take on the function of basic military training for all residents of their respective settlements, regardless of gender? This training can be funded by amalgamated territorial communities with the assistance of the state or funds that are interested in it. And the training could be led by veterans who have retired for health reasons.

Another viable option is for certified training organizations to offer preparatory military instruction programs to the population. Many people are already using such services. Local authorities should conclude agreements with these companies and finance the training of the population, again, with the involvement of relevant public non-governmental funds. This is all possible.

Defense Minister [Rustem] Umerov approved the Concept of Military Personnel Policy of the Ministry of Defense. In particular, it calls for replacing conscription with recruitment. Will this help improve the situation with the mobilization reserve in the short term?

This problem has no quick fix. The mobilization reserve is nurtured for years. The concept is only a declaration of intent, planned until 2028. On its basis, relevant laws need to be adopted, specific mechanisms need to be developed, etc.

I think that we will have to continue this war with the old system of mobilization, which will exist in parallel with the new structure – recruiting centers at our combat brigades.

For example, the 3rd Assault Brigade opened its center in Lviv back in July of this year. The Azov units have recently announced their center. More and more centers like this will appear because the frontline needs fighters.

But the centers are also forced to work virtually “just-in-time”. At the 3rd Assault Center, for example, training for the front lasts less than three months. Can this kind of basic military training be considered sufficient?

I have already said: we are now dealing with the consequences of our many years of infantilism. And two months of targeted training in accordance with the specific needs of the brigade is better than general training of mobilized people through the military enlistment center.