‘Protecting power plants and encasing them in concrete is unrealistic’: Deputy mayor on whether Kyiv is ready for toughest winter yet

"We appealed to the ministries not to mislead people"

hromadske: In recent months Russia has launched focused, large-scale strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector. How critical is the damage in Kyiv so far, and does the capital enter this winter with confidence that it can withstand another wave of attacks on power infrastructure?

Petro Pantelieiev: Scheduled and emergency power outages are in effect. Still, we managed to start the heating season. As always, there has been some initial damage — routine problems have not gone away, and war-related ones keep piling up.

But before this heating season began, we fully restored all energy facilities damaged in previous years. At one point, 80% of our generating capacity was knocked out.

hromadske: Yet energy experts — including in our most recent interview — say the country has not restored everything destroyed or damaged even in 2022-2023.

PP: By late summer-early fall, before the current wave of strikes (on energy facilities -ed.), we had 100% capacity. That took billions of hryvnias in repairs — an enormous effort.

Now we are repairing again, doing the same work. There is no alternative.

We also completed 100% of the preparations required by regulation for the heating season. Winter readiness is a top priority. We replaced the most worn-out sections of electrical grids and tested and replaced the most vulnerable heating networks. Kyiv has more than 3,000 kilometers of heating pipes; obviously, we cannot replace them all during wartime, but over the summer, we managed to swap out 50 kilometers.

How well protected are Kyiv’s energy facilities?

Planned engineering protection work has been carried out at power plants and substations, and more is ongoing throughout the winter. First-level protection — gabion barriers — is complete; second-level concrete shelters are now under construction.

The Kyiv Defense Council, a collegial body comprising representatives from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, State Emergency Service, Security Service (SBU), Interior Ministry, and other relevant agencies, has approved a series of protective measures in line with the General Staff's requirements.

Where it is physically possible, protection is being built. We have to be honest: encasing an entire thermal power plant in concrete is simply unrealistic.

So Kyiv’s two main thermal power plants currently have the lowest level of protection?

There are only two. A third, “sarcophagus-style” level exists only in theory.

…And this comes as accusations grow louder that energy facilities are inadequately protected.

We have heard those accusations. But every Russian barrage now hits different facilities across the country. It should be obvious that some objects cannot be protected to the point of being invulnerable.

We have already asked the relevant ministries to stop misleading the public. A thermal power plant simply cannot be given second-level protection.

Yet millions are being spent on exactly that.

Look: take a substation. Protecting it fully is extremely difficult. Certain components can be shielded — same with thermal plants. We might spend 100 million hryvnias ($2.4 million) on one element, but if the missile hits the unprotected part next to it, everything is lost. Comprehensive protection that would let a plant survive direct hits is impossible.

Raising this issue publicly plays into the enemy’s hands — discussing what was hit, what was not. In my view it is counterproductive. Doubtful claims shape public opinion, and suddenly the missile is not to blame; the city supposedly failed to protect something that could never be fully protected.

How much has been allocated for first- and second-level protection?

First-level measures were carried out using the resources of the municipal critical-infrastructure company (Kyivteploenergo -ed.). A large-scale project to build distributed cogeneration units — which includes second-level protection from the start — is now underway. That project is being implemented by the same municipal company, which since martial law was declared has been capitalized with more than 2 billion hryvnias ($47.6 million) from the city budget.

The total cost of protective structures under the distributed-cogeneration project and second-level protection on existing facilities exceeds 2.7 billion hryvnias ($64.2 million) — entirely city and municipal funds. Kyiv has received no state-budget money for this.

"It is impossible to power the entire city with some alternative energy system"

Are protection works finished at the strategically vital CHP-5 and CHP-6 plants?

We have publicly stated that first-level protection is complete. After the work was done, state agencies conducted inspections and issued certificates confirming the work was carried out satisfactorily.

Who is responsible for oversight — the city or the State Agency for Restoration?

Oversight falls to the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection. The Restoration Agency is tasked with building second-level protection.

Yet criticism, including defenses of CHP-5 and CHP-6 — even from the president — continues to target city authorities. Can you clarify who is ultimately responsible for protecting critical infrastructure in Kyiv?

In wartime, responsibility at the state, city, agency, and enterprise levels can only be integrated, with clearly defined tasks, expertise, and authority. We should focus on coordination and pooling resources rather than competing with one another.

Energy-security issues are too critical to start shifting blame or looking for scapegoats. There is no room here for unilateral decisions or sole responsibility.

The government’s new Energy Protection Coordination Headquarters, created in October, underscores exactly that and, I hope, will help consolidate efforts across energy, communications, water, and heating systems.

What is the power situation in Kyiv after damage to CHP-5, CHP-6 and the Trypillia TPP? Outages now last 5-7 hours. What would improve things?

We are part of Ukraine’s unified energy system. The facilities you mentioned are far from the only ones damaged nationwide. That is why we have scheduled outages. Power engineers — who deserve our thanks — are working around the clock on repairs. The timeline will determine when things get better.

Further attacks could exacerbate the situation. That is the reality we will face this winter: potentially long periods without electricity and possibly without heat. We have to prepare for that.

Is Kyiv ready for prolonged blackouts?

We have already experienced partial blackouts. We have a tested resilience plan for total blackouts. Without going into sensitive details, priority goes to supplying heat, water, and electricity to hospitals, maternity wards, geriatric centers, and the like. Sector-specific measures will be implemented depending on the scenario.

This year ,we significantly strengthened backup power. Nearly 300 generators of various capacities are ready. We have 55 mobile boiler units that can be connected to hospitals and other facilities for temporary heat; they performed well in previous winters, so we are increasing the fleet to 70 by year-end. We are also rolling out the distributed-generation concept I mentioned — mini-CHP plants are now being installed.

All these measures aim to keep critical facilities running. Obviously, it is impossible to power the entire city with an alternative system.

An underground duplicate energy system is science fiction. Kyiv consumes 1.3 gigawatts; that would require roughly 15 underground power stations. Even in peacetime, building a single thermal plant took at least five years. We are now at war, facing massive missile barrages, constant repairs, and shortages of money and manpower.

Prioritization, organization, and rapid restoration are what matter. We have been through this before. Given the intensified strikes, different scenarios are possible, but we are resource-ready to respond.

On a smaller scale, more than 1,000 apartment buildings — about 8% of the city's total — now have resilient status thanks to city co-financing programs. We have supplied them with over 4,500 backup units (generators, power banks, solar stations).

To keep traffic moving, 70% of traffic lights now have batteries that last 24 hours without grid power. We are modernizing the outdated Soviet-era public-alert system; half the city now has digital alerts with batteries that run 4-6 hours without electricity.

You mentioned cogeneration. That is the energy-recovery concept adopted a year and a half ago, which included six or seven new mini-CHP plants. Has it been implemented, and what has it cost?

We are talking about seven gas-piston units; six are scheduled to come online by the end of this year and are currently being installed.

These cogeneration units provide backup power for critical infrastructure. A large heating plant (like a large boiler room) shuts down without electricity; no generator is powerful enough to keep it running. A mini-CHP keeps the big plant online and can supply surplus power to nearby homes.

These are not plug-in generators — they are serious power plants with more than 20 megawatts capacity, enough to supply a third of a district. Each requires individual design, site-specific engineering and integrated concrete shelters. We will see how they perform; nothing like this — power plants inside protective shells — exists anywhere else in the world.

The core idea is to make them much harder for the enemy to hit than a traditional CHP, which covers 100 hectares — the size of a residential neighborhood — and cannot be protected.

The [mini-CHPs] are expensive. The entire program, including equipment, installation, and protective structures, costs roughly 10.5 billion hryvnias ($249.4 million). Funding comes partly from the city budget, partly from the municipal energy company Kyivteploenergo, and some equipment was provided by the UNDP.

“Political elements”: the rift with the military administration

After major attacks, when power goes out in Kyiv, water often disappears too. Is that because Kyivvodokanal pumping stations lack backup power?

When an attack triggers protective automation, everything shuts down, even without direct hits — including water systems. A pumping station consumes 30 megawatts; no backup exists at that scale short of a mini-CHP. One of the seven units will serve [the water utility company] Kyivvodokanal.

We are talking seven mini-CHPs at 10.5 billion hryvnias ($249.4 million). To fully back up all critical infrastructure, we would need perhaps 30.

Kyivvodokanal has equipped artesian wells and other equipment with large generators. We are also installing one diesel mini-CHP for Kyivvodokanal facilities this winter — another real-world test.

But isn’t this testing coming late, in the fourth year of the full-scale war?

Kyiv was the first city in Ukraine to adopt the cogeneration concept. Has any other city bought such units? Has the state budget allocated money for them?

If we want to judge whether we are doing well or poorly, we need something to compare against. We developed a plan, found funding and equipment, and we are executing it. Of course everyone wants results instantly — we do too. But many of these solutions are being pioneered under fire; quality and durability take time.

I have to ask about the now-public standoff between the mayor’s team and the president-appointed head of the Kyiv Military Administration. Tymur Tkachenko’s latest accusations include derailing the purchase of more than 100 mobile shelters, ignoring relocation of affected residents, and insufficient defense spending. How do you respond, and what do you make of the conflict itself?

As acting first deputy mayor responsible for life-support systems, stable energy supply and crisis response, I will say only this: public confrontation and systematic pressure on city departments and enterprises do nothing but harm and destabilize — especially in wartime. Political feuding must take a back seat; all efforts need to be united against the real enemy that attacks us daily.

So you see this as political?

Yes, there are political elements and attempts to undermine trust in the city’s actions.

You are reluctant to delve into the conflict itself, but how much does it affect day-to-day work and create concrete problems for the city?

It creates numerous obstacles and harms critical processes overall. We should be solving the mountain of real problems, not overcoming artificial ones.

Shelters, housing repairs, and compensation

Take the latest claim of nearly derailing the purchase of mobile shelters, for which half a billion hryvnias ($11.9 million) was allocated. Where do those purchases stand?

We see no reason for disruption. Funds have been transferred to district administrations, which can procure the shelters and everything needed.

Only this fall were legal and technical standards for mobile shelters finally clarified, allowing legitimate procurement. Immediately afterward the city allocated more than 500 million hryvnias. The legal framework, money and district administrations are all in place. Procurement should proceed.

Two years ago there was a major scandal over locked or substandard shelters. Has the situation improved? How many have been upgraded, and how much has been spent?

Significant work continues on shelters. This year roughly 4 billion hryvnias ($95 million) was allocated for new shelters and major repairs of existing ones — a priority that continues annually.

Kyiv has 4,300 civil-defense facilities of varying type, ownership and condition. Since the full-scale invasion began, nearly 2,500 shelters and basements have been repaired — both minor and capital repairs — at a cost of nearly 3.5 billion hryvnias ($83.1 million) from the city budget.

Residents affected by strikes often say they are left to fend for themselves — commissions drag on for months, windows stay broken in apartment buildings. How do you assess the pace of repairs of damaged and destroyed housing, and can the Kyiv City State Administration expedite the process?

It depends on the severity of damage. Major structural damage can take a year or more — surveys, design, tenders. We worked with the government to streamline some procedures, but it remains time-consuming.

When it comes to repairing minor damage (to roofs or windows), it is simpler. But even so, a procedure is still required to determine the scope of work, allocate funds from the budget for this work, and then carry out the work itself — which again involves tenders, procurement, and the actual work.

As for damage to apartments (broken windows, etc.), the eRecovery program is in effect. The only thing is that a commission must inspect the apartment, confirm and note all damage. We had a situation where the Solomyanskyi district was totally devastated, and the commission was overwhelmed. We mobilized all districts, created additional commissions, and expanded their membership. Currently, there are no delays in the inspection or the work of the commissions. We are preparing the documents as quickly as possible.

However, we understand people because they want things to happen "right now." And here we need to strike a reasonable balance between meeting expectations and not breaking the law. Work is ongoing in this area. We will do everything we can to speed up the process.

Since February 2022, nearly 4,000 buildings have been damaged or destroyed, including nearly 3,000 residential structures — roughly a quarter of the city’s housing stock, though most need only windows, roofing, or relatively quick repairs. Restoration work continues on all fronts. 25 heavily damaged apartment buildings have been fully restored; residents have returned home.

What about relocation? Is there anywhere to move people, and does the mechanism work?

Most Kyivans now know they can receive cash compensation for rent rather than city-provided housing: a one-time 40,000 hryvnias ($950) plus 20,000 ($475) monthly until their building is repaired. The vast majority choose this option. Rent payments will continue until the housing is restored.

We do have reserve housing and the ability to resettle people. In every case, this option is available. However, in the vast majority of cases, people choose cash. This year, 233 million hryvnias ($5.5 million) have been allocated for these types of assistance, which has been received by 15.4 thousand affected families.

We have resources and capabilities for restoration, resettlement, and monetary compensation. It is simply necessary to communicate this effectively to the people. Perhaps not just once, but three times. There is work to be done in this area, and we are aware of this.

10% of the defense budget

The head of the Kyiv City Military Administration Tymur Tkachenko has also accused the city authorities of underfunding security and defense needs. How much was allocated this year?

Roughly 11 billion hryvnias ($261.3 million). The total city budget is large at about 90 billion ($2.1 billion), much of it for salaries.

The development budget — for repairs, new facilities, shelters, etc. — is around 15 billion ($356.3 million). Comparing 9 and 15 billion is one thing. But if you compare 90 billion in the total budget and 9 billion for the front, that's more than 10%.

Comparing military spending with teachers' salaries is probably not entirely fair. That is why I believe that the assistance provided by the city is significant. We do not refuse any of the urgent requests we receive from the military.

There is a program called "Defender" within which this funding is provided. That is, we do not The Defender program is in effect, within which this funding takes place. That is, we do not purchase equipment for military units. The funds are transferred as a subsidy to military units.

Finally, what do you see as the biggest challenge facing the capital right now?

This winter — for Kyiv and for Ukraine. It will be the hardest yet. Russia is clearly trying to destroy the entire energy system and will intensify strikes when the cold hits.

But we will get through this winter. One thing is enduring hardship when everyone pulls together; another is when people trip each other up. Our difficulties are multiplied by various current factors, but this is not our first year living this way.